Bad news turned good: reversal under censorship by Smirnov, Aleksei & Starkov, Egor
  
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 307 
 
 
Bad News Turned Good:  
Reversal Under Censorship 
 
 
 
 
Aleksei Smirnov and Egor Starkov 
 
 
 
November 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Zurich 
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship∗
Aleksei Smirnov†, Egor Starkov‡
November 13, 2018
Abstract
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of
these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship.
We find that if the share of such “naive” consumers is not too large, then rational consumers
treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This
makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the high-type seller to use them as a costly signal
of his product’s quality to rational consumers.
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1 Introduction
Word of mouth has long been a significant source of information about product features and
quality. One of its manifestations in the digital age is online product reviews. Opinions of fellow
consumers often seem more trustworthy than sellers’ product descriptions, and the sheer numbers of
reviews offer a great diversity of viewpoints. However, sellers can undermine this learning channel,
and one instrument they often have for doing so is censorship, i.e., removing unfavorable reviews of
their own product.1
It is straightforward that whenever censorship is possible and its cost is low, it will be employed
to at least some extent. A naive conjecture would be that if the seller can censor at will, then no
meaningful bad reviews ever remain, and those that do convey absolutely no information. This
is because the seller would delete any review that harms sales. However, in practice we observe
plenty of informative bad reviews even when censorship opportunities exist (e.g., on sellers’ own
websites). This paper asks the following questions: first, why might the seller be willing to not
censor unfavorable reviews? Furthermore, how is the informational content of such reviews affected
by censorship? Finally, how can bad reviews increase sales?
Our paper answers these questions in the setting where some consumers do not account for the
possibility of censorship itself.2 We construct a model in which a long-lived seller offers for sale
a good of privately known quality to a sequence of short-lived consumers. Consumption utility is
suggestive about the product quality and is relayed to future consumers through product reviews,
which may be deleted by the seller. Consumers differ in what inferences they make from posted
reviews: some consumers are strategic – i.e., fully aware of the seller’s censorship capabilities – while
others are naive and ignore censorship.
The main result of the paper (Theorem 2) states that if naive consumers are present in the
market but do not dominate it, then there exist equilibria in which bad reviews are revealed on
the equilibrium path in a payoff-relevant way. The main driving force behind this phenomenon
is explained by our second result (Theorem 1), which states that having no bad reviews should
actually be perceived as bad by a strategic consumer. In other words, in any equilibrium, any
strategic consumer improves her belief about the product quality upon observing any review that
says the product is bad. Bad reviews are only revealed in equilibrium to signal product quality to
strategic consumers, and this signal is only credible if it has the potential to hurt sales to naive
consumers.
The reason why any bad review has to improve the seller’s reputation is two-fold. The main idea
is that it only makes sense for the seller to reveal a bad review if it does not have any detrimental
effect on future sales. The direct effect can then be formulated as follows: if a bad review was
published and it harms sales to naive consumers, then it should increase sales to strategic consumers,
as otherwise it would not have been published. In particular, this increase in sales is attained by
improving the product’s reputation in the eyes of strategic consumers.
The expectancy effect is more involved. It boils down to the fact that revealing bad reviews
creates expectancy among strategic consumers in the sense of them losing faith in the product faster,
1This is plausible when we are talking about the seller’s own online store, where he has absolute power over the
content posted on the website – including product reviews. However, censorship is possible in other settings as well,
see Section 2 for the discussion.
2See Section 2 for empirical evidence of consumers’ naivetè when making inferences from product reviews.
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so the seller has to be compensated – reputation-wise – for exposing himself to this expectancy. To
elaborate, the direct effect above states that driving naive consumers out of the market with a bad
review is a strong positive signal for strategic consumers. Then absence of bad reviews in such a
situation is a strong negative signal – strategic consumers become rapidly disenchanted about the
product in the absence of bad reviews. This is what we call a state of high expectancy. Any bad
review that brings naive consumers closer to quitting (without actually pushing them out) drives
up the expectancy. This hurts the seller because it forces him to lose strategic consumers faster,
hence he should be compensated for exposing himself to high expectancy – meaning that the seller’s
reputation among strategic consumers has to increase after a bad review even if he does not lose
naive consumers’ demand by revealing it.
Finally, the argument above explains what happens if a bad review is revealed in equilibrium,
but does not explain why bad reviews actually work as a signaling device. Mechanically, Theorem 1
implies that the low type should be censoring more bad reviews than a high type, so the latter has
to be [at least weakly] more willing to let bad reviews out. This is indeed the case: the high-type
seller is less reluctant to reveal bad reviews and lose naive consumers because he is more confident
about receiving good reviews in the future, which will bring naive consumers back to the market.
Of course, even in the context of product reviews, censorship is not the only way the seller
can manipulate the information available to the consumer. Posting fake reviews, be it fake positive
reviews of own product or fake negative reviews of competing products, is another activity the seller
can engage in.3 While we mostly focus on censorship in this paper, Section 6 shows that our result
continues to hold in the presence of both censorship and fake reviews.
The main focus of this paper is on product reviews – and to keep things clear we will stick to
this interpretation throughout – but the model translates naturally to other settings that feature
censorship or dynamic disclosure of verifiable information. For example, instead of a seller censoring
bad reviews, one may think about the government censoring news stories in an attempt to retain
citizens’ support. In the context of venture financing, the startup may choose whether to disclose
temporary setbacks to the investors or not. A bank may disclose or withhold information about
its temporary liquidity deficit in an attempt to prevent a bank run. Our paper implies that in all
these settings if some receivers are naive, it may be beneficial for the sender to disclose bad news
or failures, since rational receivers would take the mere fact of disclosure as a good signal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the plausibility of censorship in product
reviews and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 presents a short example to convey the main
idea of the paper. In Section 4 we formulate the full model. The main results are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 contains some further discussion of the model and its extensions, while Section
7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Background and Literature Review
2.1 Censorship: Background
The main setting considered in the paper is that of a platform that the seller owns or has
moderation rights in. Examples include seller’s own website, forum, or Facebook page. In all of
3About 16% of Yelp reviews are marked as potentially fake (Luca and Zervas [2016]).
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these cases the seller is able to remove bad reviews directly. Such deeds are by definition difficult
to document, but some claims may be found.4
However, it is important to note that the seller does not need to have direct power to remove
bad reviews – he merely needs to convince whoever has this power. For example, some platforms
(such as Etsy) allow sellers to try to address buyers’ dissatisfaction and ask buyers to remove their
negative review if all issues were resolved. While most review aggregators (such as Amazon, Yelp or
TripAdvisor) do not allow the sellers to directly remove reviews, convincing, bribing, or harassing
consumers into deleting their own reviews are all viable options in those cases. Promising free
items or politely asking to contact the company before writing a bad review both have a chance of
succeeding at making the consumer remove or alter their bad review, or even not write one in the
first place. One extreme method of consumer harassment is SLAPP – Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation, – when a seller sues a reviewer primarily to deter other critics from writing
negative reviews. While these suits are rarely won in court, they are likely to succeed at forcing
the person to delete their review before the suit even reaches court, and/or at intimidating other
potential reviewers.5
Finally, in some settings the seller may get to choose more favorable reviewers – e.g., a movie
distributor picks the critics that get to write the pre-release reviews. In this setting the seller may
also ensure that no bad review gets through – either by screening the reviews directly, or by choosing
ex ante more favorable reviewers, or through repeated interaction mechanisms.6
2.2 Censorship and Review Manipulations
Academic literature on manipulations in product reviews has focused on the issue of fake reviews
(in part because those are easier to observe in the data than deleted reviews which are, by definition,
missing from the sample). We are not aware of any papers that deal with censorship in product
reviews explicitly, apart from Hauser [2018] who models censorship as depressing the rate of reviews
arrival (i.e., censorship is indiscriminate in that model). In a spirit similar to censorship, Kovbasyuk
and Spagnolo [2017] explore the effects that limited memory (in terms of old records being erased
after some time) has on market outcomes. Literature on fake reviews and review manipulation is
more prominent. Fake reviews are explored in Dellarocas [2006], Mayzlin [2006], Mayzlin, Dover,
and Chevalier [2014], and Luca and Zervas [2016]. Effects of review manipulation are investigated
in Aköz, Arbatli, and Çelik [2017] and Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Shue [2017].
Political censorship, however, has received a lot more attention in the literature. Sun [2018]
explores a model of dynamic censorship similar to ours, but without naive receivers. Besley and
Prat [2006] present a model, in which an incumbent may bribe the media to conceal a bad signal
4 “Amazon looking into claims that employees delete bad reviews for cash” (ArsTechnica), “EA Rep Reportedly
“Bribed” Reddit Mods to Remove Certain Star Wars Battlefront Posts” (PlayStation Lifestyle), and “Airbnb guests
accuse it of deleting negative reviews and boosting bad hosts” (Quartz).
5Some examples of [unsuccessful] application of this technique are described in the following news articles from
ArsTechnica: “Jeweler tries to sue anonymous woman who left 1-star Yelp review”, “Router company that threatened
a reviewer loses Amazon selling license”, and “Valve bans developer from Steam after it sues customers over bad
reviews”. One case of such suit being won is described in: “Disgruntled bride ordered to pay $115K after defamatory
posts ruin Chinese wedding-photo business” (CBC News). Again, it is by definition more difficult to find documented
instances when such harassment was successful – not in the sense of suit being won but in the sense of it forcing
consumers to remove their bad reviews.
6A recent case here is Disney banning LA Times from pre-release screenings of its movie in retaliation for other
recent articles. More details in: “LA Times: You can’t read our Thor review because Disney is mad” (ArsTechnica).
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about himself, but focus on the effects of media diversity and independence on political outcomes.
Other papers about political censorship include Shadmehr and Bernhardt [2015], Edmond [2013],
Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin [2009], Eraslan and Ozerturk [2017], and Chen and Yang [2017], but all
of them explore issues that are very different from those that we focus on.
2.3 Naivete
Evidence of consumers’ naivete when making inferences from product reviews has been provided
by Brown et al. [2012] and Li and Hitt [2008]. These papers show that at least some consumers
ignore the correlation between other players’ actions and their private information. This notion of
naivete (which is also implied in our model) has been formalized by Eyster and Rabin [2005], who
use the term “cursedness” for this type of irrationality. Market interactions under cursedness have
been studied by, e.g., Baumann and Rasch [2017] and Ispano and Schwardmann [2018].
More broadly, a wide array of empirical and experimental literature has demonstrated that
people play naively even in very basic disclosure games: see Jin [2005], Deversi, Ispano, and
Schwardmann [2018], Jin, Luca, and Martin [2018], and Sheth [2018]. In particular, Deversi et al.
[2018] and Jin et al. [2018] show that people on the receiving side of their disclosure game either
play in a way that is very close to a rational player’s strategy, or play in way that is very naive.
I.e., their players can be separated relatively well into naive and rational receivers. At the same
time, when on the senders’ side all the same people play rationally. This means that naivete is
very robust in disclosure setting: even after adopting the role of the sender and going through full
strategic reasoning of the sender, people switch roles and still play a naive strategy as a receiver.
Finally, if we are talking about political censorship rather than product reviews, then it is worth
mentioning that bipartite structure of the electorate (existence of naive voters alongside rational
voters) is quite prominent in the political economy literature. Baron [1994] and Grossman and
Helpman [1996] are the seminal models with this feature.
2.4 Disclosure
Our paper belongs to the literature on disclosure of verifiable information, since in our model the
seller can only decide whether to disclose any bad reviews written by consumers, but cannot actually
write fake reviews on his own. Static games of disclosure were originally studied by Grossman
[1981], Dye [1985], and Jung and Kwon [1988]; for a recent survey of literature on static disclosure
see Dranove and Jin [2010].
Papers in dynamic disclosure include Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer [2011], Guttman [2010],
Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz [2014], Orlov, Skrzypacz, and Zryumov [2016], and Gratton,
Holden, and Kolotilin [2018]. All of them focus on the sender’s (or senders’) choice of timing of
disclosure, while our main interest remains in the informational content of the message.
2.5 Good News, Bad News, and Countersignaling
Some of the empirical evidence points to the fact that bad reviews are not necessarily harmful:
see Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood [2006], Berger, Sorensen, and Rasmussen [2010]
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and Maslowska, Malthouse, and Bernritter [2017]. Our paper provides one possible channel through
which this phenomenon may occur in some settings.
In the classic disclosure models it is weakly (Grossman [1981]) or strictly (Jung and Kwon [1988])
optimal to not reveal the lowest signal. The literature has since provided multiple explanations for
why this result may not hold in practice. A variety of papers have been written on “the importance
of being honest” – situations where an agent has an incentive to disclose unfavorable information
(verifiable or not) in order to establish reputation for being trustworthy. See Sobel [1985], Kartik
and McAfee [2007], Dziuda [2011], and Beyer and Dye [2012] for some examples. In all of these
papers, however, the incentives for honesty are driven purely by the desire to mimic some behavioral
type of sender who never lies. Teoh and Hwang [1991], Marinovic and Varas [2016], and Corona
and Randhawa [2018] show that bad news may be worth revealing in settings where they may with
some probability be discovered by the receiver regardless. Thordal-Le Quement [2014] and Ispano
[2018] show that revealing bad news can be used as a signal of the amount of information the sender
possesses. Our paper provides a novel motivation for revealing bad reviews in the presence of a
mixed audience. On the other hand, Crawford [2003] shows that sender’s uncertainty about the
receiver’s sophistication level can lead to meaningful communication in the cheap talk extension of
even a zero-sum game. We show how these forces manifest themselves in the context of disclosure.
Harbaugh and To [2017] generate non-monotone strategies in the context of disclosure. In the
equilibria of these models only medium types choose to disclose their information, while neither high
nor low types do. The high types prefer to rely on the exogenous signal instead. This phenomenon
is generally known as “countersignaling” and can be observed in other contexts as well, e.g., costly
signaling (see Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To [2002], Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan [2006], and more
recently Kurlat and Scheuer [2017]), Bayesian Persuasion (see Chung and Eső [2013], Example 1 in
Inostroza and Pavan [2017], and Guo and Shmaya [2018]), costly disclosure (see Quigley and Walther
[2017]), and even cheap talk (see Chen [2009]). Countersignaling has also been empirically observed
by Luca and Smith [2015]. Dziuda and Salas [2017] obtain something resemblant of countersignaling
in the context of cheap talk with detectable deceit. Countersignaling is similar to our reversal result
in that the highest sender types are more likely to send lower signal than lower (medium) types
in equilibrium. However, unlike all papers mentioned above, we do not rely on public signals
to generate reversal. In addition, we focus on outcomes rather than strategies. Heinsalu [2017]
demonstrates signal reversal in the context of dynamic costly signaling (as opposed to disclosure)
with no reliance on public signals. In the equilibrium of his model low effort is initially treated as
evidence in favor of high type of the sender. The source of this reversal is, however, different from
our model.
Some existing papers study asymmetries between good and bad news. Harbaugh et al. [2017]
explore a setting in which the sender may distort signals of unknown precision before the receiver
(who may be naive about this manipulation) observes them. They discover that when the signal
realizations are good on average, the sender prefers all individual signals to be good, while if the
average is bad, then the sender wants to introduce more variance and make at least some signals
look good. Che and Mierendorff [2016] and Zhong [2017] study the question of whether learning
from good or bad news is optimal in learning problems.
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2.6 Social learning
One can also look at our model from the consumers’ side, asking the question of how social
learning proceeds in the presence of censorship. This is related to several other strands of literature.
One such strand explores moderated social learning. Kremer, Mansour, and Perry [2014] and Che
and Hörner [2018] look at a benevolent planner issuing recommendations to sequentially arriving
consumers about which option of unknown quality to choose. Some papers on dynamic persuasion
(such as Ely [2017] and Renault, Solan, and Vieille [2017]) study similar problems with more
pronounced conflict of interest between the sender and the receivers. All of these papers, however,
assume that the sender has commitment power and so may design arbitrary intertemporal disclosure
policy which needs not be sequentially rational.
Finally, our paper is resemblant of models of observational learning a la Banerjee [1992],
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [1992], and Smith and Sørensen [2000]. See Smith and
Sørensen [2011] for a review of this literature, Eyster and Rabin [2010] and Eyster and Rabin
[2014] for versions with naive consumers, and Liu and Schiraldi [2012] and Nikiforov [2015] for
examples of how herds may be manipulated by an outside party. The resemblance is that in all
these models sequentially arriving consumers learn from those before them. The difference is that
in this literature the consumers receive a private signal that is informative about the alternatives
and observe the decisions of all past consumers (but not their private information). In our paper
the consumers do not receive any private information, but instead observe the payoffs of some of
the previous consumers. This allows for a simpler inference problem and mitigates the issue of
cascades (herding on a suboptimal alternative). More generally, there exists wide literature on
social learning (e.g., Frick and Ishii [2016], Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian, and Ozdaglar [2017])
which focuses on the assumptions about players’ information structures which enable social learning
of an unknown state.
3 Illustrative Example
This section presents an example that demonstrates the simplest version of our result – that
revealing bad reviews can be profitable for the seller. Assume there are two periods t ∈ {1, 2}. A
long-lived seller offers for sale a product of privately known persistent quality θ ∈ {H,L} that he
has in infinite supply. Price is fixed at c > 0. Low-quality product always yields utility zero to
consumers. High-quality product yields utility 1 with probability q and utility 0 with probability
1− q.
In each period one short-lived consumer arrives at the market. The first consumer believes that
θ = H with probability p1. She purchases the product if and only if p1 · q > c. Conditional on the
purchase, she consumes the product immediately and with exogenous probability λ > q leaves a
review, meaning that she honestly reveals the utility that she received from consuming the product.
The seller then decides whether to remove the review. Let rθ1 denote the [endogenous] probability
with which the seller of type θ discloses a bad review (and it never makes sense to delete a good
review).
The second consumer initially has prior p1 that the product is of high quality. Upon arriving
at the market she observes the first consumer’s review unless it was removed by the seller. With
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probability 12 she is strategic and uses Bayesian updating to calculate her belief p2, so that conditional
on no review it is such that
ps2(∅)
1− ps2(∅)
=
p1
1− p1 ·
(1− λ) + λ (1− q) (1− rH1 )
(1− λ) + λ (1− rL1 ) ,
and conditional on a bad review it is given by
ps2(B)
1− ps2(B)
=
p1
1− p1 ·
λ (1− q) rH1
λrL1
.
Conditional on a good review, we trivially have that ps2(G) = 1.
On the other hand, with probability 12 the second consumer is naive and ignores the possibility
that the seller may have deleted the unfavorable review. Then her belief in the case of a bad review
is given by
pn2 (B)
1− pn2 (B)
=
p1
1− p1 ·
λ (1− q)
λ
.
In the case of no review we have pn2 (∅) = p1.
Irrespective of type, the second consumer purchases the product if and only if p2 ·q > c. Suppose
then that the parameters are such that
p1 >
c
q
> pn2 (B),
so that naive consumer in period 2 does not purchase the product after a bad review (but does
otherwise). Then it only makes sense for the seller to reveal a bad review in period 1 if losing a
sale to a potential naive consumer is offset by generating a sale to a potential strategic consumer
who would not have bought the product otherwise, i.e., we should have that ps2(B) > cq > ps2(∅).
In other words, the reaction of a strategic consumer to no review must be worse than that to a
bad review. If this is the case, then both types of the seller are indifferent between revealing a bad
review and deleting it, so any strategy profile (rH1 , rL1 ) that generates such a belief response would
constitute an equilibrium. In particular, (rH1 , rL1 ) = (1, 0) is a valid equilibrium strategy profile in
this case – we have assumed λ > q, so ps2(∅) < cq , while ps2(B) = 1.
This example demonstrates the “direct effect” of revealing bad reviews: doing so makes the seller
lose sales to naive consumers, hence should increase sales to strategic consumers. The “expectancy
effect” mentioned in the introduction does not manifest here because it requires richer dynamics.
Finally, in this example both types of the seller are indifferent between revealing a bad review at
t = 1 and not. This indifference is driven by the fact that naive and strategic consumers arrive
with equal probabilities in period 2. In the full model we show that this assumption is by no means
necessary, and in fact strict preference to reveal bad reviews can be obtained if (and only if) this
assumption is violated.
4 The Model
Time is continuous and infinite, t ∈ [0,+∞). A long-lived seller offers for sale a product of
privately known persistent quality θ ∈ {H,L}, high or low, that he has in infinite supply. Quality θ
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is hereinafter referred to as the seller’s type. The price of the product is fixed at c > 0.7 Short-lived
consumers with a unit demand arrive at the market according to a Poisson process with intensity
λ. In other words, the probability that a consumer arrives in any given time interval [t, t + dt) is
equal to λ · dt. All players are assumed to be risk-neutral and evaluate outcomes by their expected
values.
Once a consumer arrives, she and the seller instantaneously play the following stage game,
specific elements of which are described in more detail in the following subsections. The consumer
who arrives at the market observes all information available to her and decides whether to buy the
product. If she does, she receives random utility depending on product quality. After the utility is
realized, the consumer leaves a review describing her experience and then leaves the market forever.
The seller then decides whether to reveal the review or delete it. If the review is revealed, it is then
observed by all future consumers before they make their purchase decisions.
We let ht denote a complete history of the game up to (but not including) time t. It includes
current time, the purchase decisions of all consumers who arrived before t, all reviews they wrote,
and all respective censorship decisions of the seller. The following subsections elaborate on various
parts of the game and introduce notation that will be used throughout.
4.1 Consumers
Consumers arrive at the market according to a Poisson process with intensity λ. Each arriving
consumer observes the current time and all reviews written by previous consumers that were not
deleted by the seller. The consumer does not observe the purchase decisions of the previous
consumers and does not observe whether any reviews were deleted.
The consumers’ payoffs are as follows. If a consumer leaves the market without buying the
product, she receives utility 0. Consuming a high-quality product yields utility 1 with probability
q and utility 0 with probability 1− q, while a low-quality product always yields utility 0.8 Without
loss we let consumers’ utility be linear in money, so buying the product at price c creates a disutility
of c utils.
Each arriving consumer has a “cognitive type” γ ∈ {s, n}, hereinafter referred to as consumer’s
type. Strategic consumers (γ = s, share µ ∈ [0, 1) of the population) go through full Bayesian
reasoning to infer product quality based on published reviews, taking the seller’s censorship strategy
into account. Naive consumers (γ = n, share 1 − µ) use Bayesian updating for any reviews they
observe but are unaware of possible moderation, i.e., they assume that the seller never removes
any reviews. For technical reasons, we also assume that naive consumers do not observe or ignore
the times at which reviews were written (unlike strategic consumers).9 Consumers’ types are i.i.d.
within the sequence of arriving consumers.
Let pγ(ht) denote the probability that consumer of type γ assigns to the product being of high
7Allowing the seller to set the price would allow for price signaling, while in this paper we focus solely on censorship.
That said, giving the seller the control over price could be an interesting (and non-trivial) extension.
8This renders any good review into conclusive evidence that the product is of high quality. This assumption of
“conclusive good news” is relatively standard in the experimentation literature (see Keller, Rady, and Cripps [2005]
and the subsequent literature) since it makes the models a lot more tractable. We relax this assumption in Section
6.3 and show that the main result survives under arbitrary information structures.
9This assumption can be easily disposed of at the cost of more complicated assumptions about off-equilibrium-path
beliefs (described in Section 4.3).
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quality given history ht. She then buys the product at ht if and only if her expected consumption
utility exceeds price c, i.e.,
pγ(ht) · (q · 1 + (1− q) · 0) + (1− pγ(ht)) · 0 > c,
or, equivalently, pγ(ht) > p¯ where p¯ := c/q. This behavior will be taken for granted for the remainder
of the paper. To avoid triviality, the parameters are assumed such that p¯ ∈ (0, 1) and consumers’
prior is pγ(h0) > p¯. We further assume that consumers buy the product when indifferent.
In addition, it will prove convenient to have a separate piece of notation for updated beliefs. Let
fγ(ht) denote the belief pγ of a consumer arriving in the moment t + dt following history ht and
observing that a bad review was posted at t.
After the utility is realized, the consumer leaves a review. The question of why people decide
to leave product reviews is interesting in itself, since in general writing a review costs time and
effort and yields little benefit, but this question lies beyond the scope of this paper.10 In our model,
writing a review does not in any way affect the consumer’s payoff. Therefore, we model this decision
as non-strategic, saying that all consumers leave a review and do so truthfully.11 Since the utility
that a consumer may receive from consumption is binary, so are the reviews. A consumer who
decided to leave a review and received utility 1 leaves a good review, while one who received utility
0 leaves a bad review.
4.2 The Seller
The seller is long-lived and discounts future at rate r > 0. He always observes the complete
history ht of the game so far, as well as his own type θ. We assume that the seller has zero cost
of producing the product and thus receives profit c from every purchase. Therefore, instantaneous
expected flow profit for type θ seller at history ht, given that consumers’ purchasing decisions are
as described above, is equal to λcpi(ht) where pi(ht) measures expected sales per arriving consumer:
pi(ht) = (1− µ) · I(pn(ht) > p¯) + µ · I(ps(ht) > p¯),
with I(·) being an indicator function. Then the seller’s discounted future profit (normalized by 1λc)
is given by
V θ(ht) =
1
λc
· E
 +∞ˆ
t
e−r(u−t)pi(hu)du |ht, θ
 , (1)
where the expectation is taken over future histories hu. Note that seller’s type θ enters (1) only
through this expectation. Also, conditioning on ht implies that this value function is evaluated
before the seller knows whether a consumer (and, consequently, a review) arrives at time t.
The seller only has a nontrivial choice of action at those histories at which a new review arrives.
10Li et al. [2016] explore a setting in which the seller may choose to reward the consumer for writing a review.
While this may serve as one possible explanation, we feel that other, more psychological, channels are at play as well.
11Any model that generates truthful reporting would work in supporting our results. For example, one may assume
that consumers experience warm glow from providing truthful information to future consumers. Alternatively, the
whole situation can be seen as a reciprocity game with the seller in which the consumer wants to reward good products
with good reviews and punish bad products using bad reviews.
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The seller then has to decide whether to disclose it or not.12,13 Any good review perfectly reveals
the high quality of the product, guaranteeing that all future consumers of any type will buy the
product, and is thus never concealed by a seller. Therefore, the seller only faces a nontrivial choice
when a bad review arrives. We denote by rθ(ht) the probability with which seller of type θ reveals
(or discloses) a bad review that arrives at history ht.
4.3 Equilibrium Definition
All consumers in our model are short-lived, so their behavior is myopic. The only strategic
player is the seller. He maximizes his value (1) given the consumers’ behavior, and the latter only
depends on their current and future beliefs p := (pn, ps). Given that all available information about
future beliefs is contained in current beliefs and the seller’s strategy, and that the seller observes all
the information that the consumers see, current beliefs p(ht) are a sufficient statistic of history ht.
Therefore, we can essentially without loss of generality focus on Markov setting with state p and
redefine all objects accordingly.14 For example, the seller’s strategy in such a setting is described
by rθ(pt) = rθ(p(ht)) := rθ(ht).
We are then looking for Markov Perfect Equilibria of the game, which consist of a strategy
profile
(
rH , rL
)
and updating rules for beliefs p such that
1. at any state p strategy rθ for the seller of type θ maximizes V θ(p) given the updating rules
for pt and the initial condition p0 = p;
2. beliefs p are updated given strategies
(
rH , rL
)
in such a way that
• ps is updated using Bayes’ rule whenever possible;
• pn is updated using Bayes’ rule whenever possible under the assumption that rH(p) =
rL(p) = 1 for all p;
• pγ = 0 at histories that a consumer of type γ perceives as being off the equilibrium path.
The latter condition about off-path histories is made purely for convenience and is without loss
of generality: if there exists an equilibrium with some off-path beliefs, it can as well be sustained
by the most pessimistic off-path belief.
12We assume that deleting a review is costless. This may contradict some motivating examples in which deleting
reviews is costly, as the company/government has to sustain a customer service/censorship apparatus. However, we
argue that if the company engages in censorship, the marginal cost of deleting another review is essentially zero.
13We assume that reviews cannot be held in a “moderation queue” and revealed later, as well as that published
reviews cannot be deleted in the future. The former assumption is made mostly for convenience and has no effect on
our results, but the latter assumption is crucial. It can be justified by the folk wisdom that “nothing can be deleted
from the Internet” (see the “Streisand effect”). We further do not allow the seller to modify review contents (see
Section 2.2 for references to papers that do).
14Formally, some equilibria are lost as a result of the restriction to Markov strategies. In particular, many states
p admit multiple possible continuation equilibria. In this case we lose [Perfect Bayesian] equilibria which prescribe
different continuations at different histories ht which generate the same state pt. However, this is not a meaningful
loss in the sense that any payoff profile attainable in some PBE of our model can also be generated by some MPE
(possibly augmented by a public randomization device).
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5 Equilibrium Analysis
This section contains the characterization of equilibria of the game, which culminates in the two
main results. Formal proofs of all statements can be found in the Appendix. We start, however,
with discussing some preliminaries.
5.1 Preliminaries: Multiplicity
Like most communication games, our model suffers from the multiplicity of self-fulfilling
equilibria.15 The loop for any given state p proceeds as follows: if no bad reviews are ever revealed at
p, then strategic consumers are allowed to have arbitrary beliefs in case a bad review is revealed at p.
In particular, consumers can ascribe fs(p) = 0 after such an off-path event, which makes revealing
a bad review at p a weakly dominated action for any seller because the naives’ demand cannot
increase after a bad review, thus closing the loop. Using this reasoning, we can “ban” disclosure of
bad reviews on any subset of the state space.16 We do not refine such situations away, but our main
interest lies in the regions where bad reviews are disclosed.
One particular equilibrium deserves special attention:
Definition 1. An equilibrium is fully censored if
(
rH(p), rL(p)
)
= (0, 0) for all p ∈ [0, 1]2.
In the fully censored equilibrium, all bad reviews are always deleted. This equilibrium is special
in the sense that it always exists, as the reasoning above implies. One of the main contributions of
our paper is showing that equilibria exist that are not fully censored (or payoff-equivalent to fully
censored equilibrium), i.e., bad reviews are revealed in a payoff-relevant way in such equilibria. In
other words, censorship is a trivial phenomenon in equilibrium; it is the lack of censorship that is
not trivial.
To make the classification of equilibria easier, consider the following piece of notation. Given
some equilibrium, let R ⊆ [0, 1]2 denote the set of states in which bad reviews are revealed on
equilibrium path with positive probability: R := {p| (rH(p), rL(p)) 6= (0, 0)}. Then after observing
a bad review at some p ∈ R the strategic consumer updates her belief ps using Bayes’ rule, while
after a bad review at p /∈ R the refinement we have adopted implies that fs(p) = 0. The fully
censored equilibrium is characterized by R = ∅.
5.2 Preliminaries: Beliefs
This section explores how beliefs p = (pn, ps) are updated throughout the game. At any given
history, one of three mutually exclusive events can happen: a good review is posted, i.e., written by
a consumer and not deleted by the seller, a bad review is posted, or no new reviews are posted. After
any single good review the product is revealed to be good, and beliefs of both types of consumers
jump to pn = ps = 1. Conditional on the other two events, the two types of consumers update their
beliefs differently.
Recall that fγ(p) denotes the posterior belief of a consumer of type γ who has observed a bad
review posted in state p. For a strategic consumer, Bayes’ rule prescribes that the belief is updated
15“Self-fulfilling equilibrium” is used as a heuristic notion and not in the sense of any formal definition.
16More generally, bad reviews can be banned at arbitrary sets of histories ht of the game, leading to some non-
Markov equilibria.
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as
fs(p)
1− fs(p) =
ps
1− ps ·
(1− q) · rH(p)
rL(p)
. (2)
A naive consumer uses the same Bayes’ rule to update her beliefs but under the assumption that
rθ(p) = 1 for both θ. Therefore, her belief is updated as
fn(p)
1− fn(p) =
pn
1− pn · (1− q) . (3)
Note that the right-hand side does not depend on ps or equilibrium strategies rθ(p), so fn(p) in
any equilibrium is fully described by the pn coordinate of the current state. The (1− q) term in (2)
and (3) is the “inherent meaning” of a bad review – the fact that absent any other information, the
belief should decrease. The r
H(p)
rL(p)
ratio in (2) represents the information about quality θ contained
in the seller’s strategies.
Finally, if no reviews are published during [t, t+dt) then strategic consumers update their beliefs
as
pst+dt
1− pst+dt
=
pst
1− pst
· (1− λpi(p)dt) + λpi(p)dt · (1− q) ·
(
1− rH(pt)
)
(1− λpi(p)dt) + λpi(p)dt · (1− rL(pt)) .
By the usual argument, which involves taking logarithms of both sides and using the approximation
ln(1 + x) ≈ x for small x, we obtain
p˙s = λps (1− ps)pi(p) · [(1− q) · (1− rH(p))− (1− rL(p))] .
Hereinafter we use a shorthand notation for the drift termD(p) := (1− q)·(1− rH(p))−(1− rL(p)),
so the expression above can be written as
p˙s = λps (1− ps) · pi(p)D(p). (4)
For naive consumers, the similar procedure under the assumption rH(p) = rL(p) = 1 yields
p˙n = 0. Since the intensity λ of reviews’ arrival in the absence of censorship is the same for high-
and low-quality products, the lack of reviews is uninformative for naive consumers, and their belief
stays frozen until a new review is published.
5.3 Preliminaries: Bands and Patience
In the analysis it will prove useful to have measures of demand for the two groups of consumers.
Demand here is understood not in the sense of “how much a given consumer buys” but rather “how
long it takes until type-γ consumers stop buying the product.” We introduce these measures of
“how long” in different ways for naive and strategic consumers.
Belief pn of naive consumers in the absence of good reviews is fully determined by the number
of posted bad reviews. In particular, it is independent of time, so naive consumers do not change
their purchasing behavior as long as no new reviews are posted. We can, however, keep track of how
many more bad reviews they are ready to observe in the absence of good reviews before they stop
buying the product. We do this by partitioning the state space (pn, ps) into “bands” {Bk}k>0, where
k corresponds to the number of bad reviews needed to drop the naive consumers’ belief pn below the
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Figure 1: state space, “bands” and an example path of beliefs
threshold p¯. In particular, let B0 := {p|pn ∈ [0, p¯)} and for k ∈ N let Bk := {p|f(p) ∈ Bk−1}\Bk−1.
Additionally, let Bk+ := ∪k′>kBk′ . We further split each band into two parts according to whether
ps is above or below p¯, with B↑k := Bk ∩ {ps > p¯} and B↓k := Bk ∩ {ps < p¯}.
Figure 1 illustrates bands together with an example path of beliefs from time zero until a point
where all consumers stop buying the product in the absence of a good review. Solid arrows show
how beliefs drift over time in the absence of reviews, dotted arrows show how beliefs jump when a
bad review is disclosed, and p¯ is such that fn(p¯, ps) = p¯ for arbitrary ps.
On the other hand, to measure strategic consumers’ demand we use their “patience” τ(p) – the
time it takes strategic consumers to quit the market in the absence of any reviews. Formally, for
any k and all p ∈ Bk, let
τ(p) := inf{t|pt ∈ B↓k, p0 = p},
where the evolution of pt is given by (4).17 Let τ(p) = +∞ if pt never reaches B↓k from p.
Since “deleting all future bad reviews” is an available strategy, τ(p) gives a lower bound on time
for which a seller can keep strategic consumers in the market starting at p. As we will see in Section
5.5, the low-type seller can actually do no better than this, meaning that τ(p) is the exact measure
of residual demand from strategic consumers faced by the low-type seller.
Two important properties of τ(p) are worth noting. Firstly, it follows directly from (4) (see
17To clarify, τ(p) is not the “calendar time” of the game when it reaches B↓k , but rather the time it takes beliefs to
drift from p to B↓k . If the origin state p was reached at some time t then B
↓
k will be reached at time t+ τ(p) in the
absence of posted reviews. This interpretation of time is used throughout the paper, and calendar time is ignored
throughout.
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Lemma 4 in the Appendix) that for any p ∈ B↑k for some k, τ(p) can be expressed as
τ(p) = −
psˆ
p¯
1
λz (1− z) · pi(pn, z)D(pn, z)dz.
Secondly, we claim that τ(p) is actually finite for interior ps:
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, τ(p) < +∞ and, thus, D(p) < 0 for all p with ps < 1.
The formal proof is contained in the Appendix, although the intuition behind it is simple.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists p such that τ(p) = +∞. Then once in state p,
the seller is able to retain strategic consumers forever by deleting all future bad reviews. On the
other hand, τ(p) = +∞ implies that there exists some state pˆ with D(pˆ) > −ε and τ(pˆ) > 1ε for
any small ε > 0. The former property implies that some type of the seller should be willing to
reveal a bad review at pˆ (since otherwise D(pˆ) = −q by (4)), and that fs(pˆ) < pˆs by the martingale
property of beliefs.18 The latter fact – that τ(pˆ) is effectively infinite – implies that revealing a bad
review should also retain strategic consumers for an arbitrarily long time (i.e., τ(f(pˆ)) ≈ +∞), as
otherwise neither type of the seller would have any incentives to reveal (since a bad review cannot
attract naive consumers). However, then we arrive at a point f(pˆ) with fs(pˆ) < pˆs and arbitrarily
large τ(f(pˆ)), so the same argument can be applied again. By iterating the procedure we are bound
to eventually arrive at a state with ps < p¯ where the strategic consumers no longer buy the product.
This leads to a contradiction, since in that state τ(p) = 0.
5.4 Main Results
The remainder of Chapter 5 is devoted to characterizing the equilibria of the game. Sections 5.5
to 5.7 provide a detailed characterization, while the current section summarizes the main results
and provides a condensed version of the intuition behind them.
The first main result, Theorem 1, states that if strategic consumers are buying the product,
then any bad review they observe when ready to buy the product will weakly improve their belief in
product quality. In particular, this implies that if a strategic consumer is willing to buy the product
after observing current time, then reading bad reviews cannot change her mind. We dub this result
“reversal”, since strategic consumers’ reaction to bad reviews is reversed from its natural direction
– instead of decreasing ps, any bad review manages to increase it.
Theorem 1. In any equilibrium of the game: if p ∈ R and ps > p¯ then fs(p) > ps.
Condition ps > p¯ ensures that strategic consumers’ opinion actually matters. This is a sufficient
condition for reversal in our model but not a necessary one (as we see below, fs(p) > ps for
p ∈ B↓1 ∩R, even though by definition ps < p¯ for all p ∈ B↓1).
While Theorem 1 may seem trivial at first – “if a seller reveals bad reviews then it must be
profitable for him to do so” – the devil, as per the tradition, is in the details. In particular, it is
not obvious that “more profitable” corresponds to f s(p) > ps, since the latter property does not
18Given that ps strictly increases after a good review, it has to go down either after a bad review, or in the
absence of reviews. We show that D(p) = −q is required for fs(p) = ps (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix), while if
D(p) = −ε > −q, then it should be that fs(p) > ps.
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guarantee τ(f(p)) > τ(p). Before discussing the intuition behind Theorem 1 we state one of its
corollaries.
Corollary 1 is an addendum to the main result. It states that in any equilibrium, the high-type
seller is less likely to conceal any bad review than the low-type seller.
Corollary 1. In any equilibrium of the game: if p ∈ R and ps > p¯ then rH(p) > rL(p).
This corollary is an immediate consequence of equation (2) and Theorem 1. While formally
trivial, this corollary is valuable in that it describes the mechanism at work in Theorem 1: reversal
is achieved via the low-type seller deleting more bad reviews than the high type. The fact that a
bad review was not deleted is then a strong signal of high quality, which in the end outweighs the
inherently negative information contained in the review.
The reasoning behind Theorem 1 proceeds in two steps. First we show that in any equilibrium
the low-type seller must be indifferent between revealing and deleting a bad review at any p ∈ R
(see Lemma 2 below). Then we show that any strategy profile that satisfies this indifference also
necessarily satisfies the first statement of the Theorem.
Arguably the more interesting part of the proof is the second step: from indifference to
f s(p) > ps. This result comes through two main channels: the direct effect and the expectancy
effect. The direct effect states that if p ∈ B1, i.e., pn > p¯ > fn(p) – naive consumers are close to
quitting the market and one more bad review drives them out, – then the seller’s decision to disclose
a bad review should be rewarded by higher demand from strategic consumers. This comes from
equilibrium reasoning: if a bad review is disclosed then it is beneficial to do so for some type of the
seller, meaning that if the seller loses naive consumers, demand from strategic consumers should
increase. This higher demand requirement then translates to an increase in reputation requirement.
The expectancy effect is more subtle and can be seen as ripples on the water, propagating the
original effect away from B1 into the B
↑
2+ region. By the martingale property of beliefs, values of
f s(p)−ps andD(p) are negatively associated for any given p.19 Therefore, the situation in B1 creates
very high expectancy for strategic consumers; either outcome affects their belief significantly. Any
bad review that is revealed improves it by a lot, but in the absence of reviews this belief deteriorates
rapidly. In particular, high expectancy makes strategic consumers impatient: for a given p, more
expectancy in the near future leads to lower patience τ(p), which is disliked by the seller. Therefore,
in order to incentivize the seller to reveal bad reviews in B↑2 – and expose himself to this state of
high expectancy, – the seller should be rewarded with a reputation premium for doing so. This
premium, in turn, increases expectancy above baseline in B↑2 , and the whole reasoning unravels to
bands B↑k with k > 2. Noteworthy is the fact that if expectancy in B
↑
1 is high enough to start
this chain reaction, then strictly positive reputation premia are required in B↑2+ to incentivize the
seller to reveal a bad review – even though this does not lead to immediate loss of naive consumers’
demand.
Our second main result, Theorem 2, demonstrates existence of equilibria in which bad reviews
are revealed in a payoff-relevant way. It claims that there exist equilibria that
1. are non-trivially different from the fully censored equilibrium in terms of payoff, and
2. admit strict reversal: fs(p) > ps for all p ∈ R.
19We use “negatively associated” as an informal term; its exact meaning is given by Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
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We construct one family of equilibria that exhibit both features, but one can easily construct an
equilibrium that has one of the above features and not the other. Hereinafter “existence” will refer
to the existence of equilibria that satisfy both properties above.
Theorem 2 (Existence). In the set of all equilibria for any given parameter values
1. if µ ∈ [0, 12 ], then all equilibria are payoff-equivalent to the fully censored equilibrium;
2. if µ ∈ (12 , 1), then there exist equilibria with R 6= ∅, which have fs(p) > ps for all p ∈ R, and
which are not payoff-equivalent to the fully censored equilibrium.
The first statement of Theorem 2 follows from Proposition 2 below, which implies that if µ < 12 ,
then R ∩ B1 = ∅. Therefore, naive consumers’ demand cannot be affected by any sequence of bad
reviews in equilibrium – bad reviews can only be revealed in B0 and B2+, where pn and fn(p) are
always on the same side of p¯. In other words, bad reviews can never work as a costly signal because
they are never actually costly in terms of driving naive consumers out of the market. Strategic
consumers then ignore bad reviews altogether. In the end, while some bad reviews may be revealed
in equilibrium, they do not have any payoff-relevant effects.
The second statement of Theorem 2 is ex ante not trivial. Basic models of disclosure (such as
Grossman [1981] and Jung and Kwon [1988]) predict that revealing bad news to a strategic audience
is always suboptimal. It is straightforward that revealing bad news to a purely naive audience is also
suboptimal. However, Theorem 1 shows that the presence of naive consumers in the market affects
strategic consumers’ reaction to bad news, rendering it positive. The main message of Theorem 2
is that this reversal is enough to warrant the revelation of bad news. Furthermore, it is easy to
think of a setting in which bad news are revealed but in an irrelevant way. For example, in the
model of Grossman [1981], the lowest type is indifferent between revealing his information and not.
The value of Theorem 2, and its second part in particular, is saying that bad news can be revealed
in a payoff-relevant way. Finally, recall that we only allow µ ∈ [0, 1) in the model. It is argued in
Section 5.5.1 that in case µ = 1, all equilibria are payoff-equivalent to the fully censored equilibrium.
Therefore, naive consumers are necessary for bad reviews to be revealed in a payoff-relevant way,
but they should not be the dominant group in the market.
The main idea behind existence is as follows. Reversal – which is satisfied by all equilibria as per
Theorem 1, and hence is a necessary condition for equilibrium – requires that the high-type seller
reveals more bad reviews than the low type (Corollary 1). Therefore, the high type must be weakly
more willing to reveal bad reviews at all p ∈ R. We show that this condition can be satisfied in B↓1
(i.e., there are equilibria with B↓1 ∩R 6= ∅) whenever µ > 12 because the high type faces higher rate
of arrival of good reviews and is thus less afraid to lose naive consumers than the low type. This
preference then extends to B↑1 to at least some extent, and propagates to B2+ as well.
The remainder of Chapter 5 characterizes the game’s equilibria in greater detail. A reader who
is not interested in these details is invited to skip to Chapter 6. Section 5.5 argues that the low-type
seller has to always be indifferent between revealing and deleting bad reviews, and demonstrates
the implications that this indifference has for equilibrium strategy profiles and belief dynamics.
Theorem 1 relies on Section 5.5 only. Section 5.6 explores the incentives of the high-type seller
conditional on low type’s indifference. Section 5.7 describes an example of the equilibrium that
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2.
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5.5 Characterization: Low Type’s Preferences
The first big step in understanding the equilibria of the game relates to incentives of the low-
type seller. In particular, we show that for any bad review that can be revealed in equilibrium, the
low-type seller must be indifferent between revealing this bad review and deleting it.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, all rL(p) ∈ [0, 1] are optimal at all p ∈ R. Consequently, deleting all
future bad reviews is an optimal continuation strategy for the low-type seller at all p. Furthermore:
1. τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑0 ∩R,
2. e−rτ(p) = 1−µµ + e
−rτ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑1 ∩R,
3. τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑2+ ∩R.
The intuition behind this result is best understood from reasoning by contradiction. Fix
arbitrary p ∈ R. If out of the two actions (deleting a bad review and not) at p the low type
only ever does one but not the other, then “the other” becomes a strong positive signal for strategic
consumers – so strong that the low-type seller should always find it strictly optimal to pick the
“other” action. The details of the argument differ for the two actions, but the essence boils down
to the reasoning above.
The behavioral strategy rL(p) = 0 (deleting a bad review at p for sure) is weakly optimal for low-
type seller at any p ∈ R by Lemma 2 and strictly optimal at any p /∈ R due to the assumption that
fs(p) = 0 for p /∈ R. Therefore, deleting all bad reviews is trivially a weakly optimal continuation
strategy. In this case V L(p) equals the discounted profit from deleting all future bad reviews:
V L(p) =
1
r
[
(1− µ) · I(pn > p¯) + µ ·
(
1− e−rτ(p)
)]
. (5)
In particular, notice that V L(p) only depends on τ(p) and the indicator I(pn > p¯).
Finally, given the optimality of deleting all future bad reviews, the equalities in Lemma 2 follow
directly by ensuring that V L(p) = V L(f(p)) for all p ∈ R. The patience of strategic consumers
should increase in such a way as to exactly compensate for the loss of naive consumers from revealing
a given bad review. In particular, it should be unchanged if the purchasing behavior of naive
consumers is unaffected by the revelation.
We now move on to exploring the implications of Lemma 2 for belief dynamics. We essentially
unravel the game by backward induction on the state space, analyzing different regions separately.
5.5.1 Band B0
In B0 = {p|pn ∈ [0, p¯)}, naive consumers are too pessimistic about the product quality to make
a purchase. If in addition ps < p¯ (i.e., p ∈ B↓0), then the same applies to strategic consumers, and
the market collapses – no purchases are made and no reviews are written. Region B↓0 is thus an
absorbing state and serves as a starting point for the “unraveling” of the state space.
If ps > p¯ (that is, p ∈ B↑0), then only strategic consumers buy the product. Since pn is frozen
absent any reviews, only two escapes are possible from B↑0 : either a good review is posted and
consumers’ beliefs jump to pn = ps = 1, in which case the seller’s strategy becomes irrelevant and
all consumers stay in the market forever, or the strategic consumers become too pessimistic and
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the game arrives at the region B↓0 described above (from Lemma 1, we know this happens in finite
time). This structure allows us to characterize continuation equilibria of the game starting from
any state p ∈ B↑0 .
Proposition 1 states that disclosure of a bad review should not affect the belief of strategic
consumers in B↑0 . Whenever naive consumers have quit the market, the seller can no longer signal
his credibility to the strategic consumers by sacrificing naive consumers’ demand.
Proposition 1. Strategy profile
(
rH(p), rL(p)
)
constitutes an equilibrium if and only if fs(p) = ps
for all p ∈ B↑0 ∩R.
From Lemma 2 we already know that since revealing a bad review at p ∈ B↑0 ∩R does not affect
the purchasing behavior of naive consumers, it should also have no effect on strategic consumers’
patience: τ(p) = τ(f(p)). It is relatively straightforward that an equilibrium with fs(p) = ps for
all p ∈ B↑0 ∩ R would satisfy this requirement. The value of Proposition 1 hence lies in showing
that the converse is also true: strategic consumers’ belief has to stay unaffected in order to warrant
τ(p) = τ(f(p)), since in any other case the equilibrium cannot be sustained. This also implies that
all equilibria are payoff-equivalent in B0.
Corollary 2. All continuation equilibria starting from any given p ∈ B0 are payoff-equivalent to
the fully censored continuation equilibrium.
This Corollary follows from the fact that at any given p, drift speed D(p) is the same whether
p /∈ R or p ∈ R and fs(p) = ps – if bad reviews are irrelevant for strategic consumers then it does
not matter whether they are revealed or not.
It is worth noting that Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 apply to the whole state space (i.e., all
histories) in case µ = 1 when all consumers are strategic. While this case is purposefully not
included in the model setup (all following results only apply to µ ∈ [0, 1)), this is mostly for sake
of narrative clarity. The fact that Proposition 1 applies globally when µ = 1 means that in the
absence of naive consumers, bad reviews are completely irrelevant under censorship. Even though
some bad reviews may be revealed in that case (since f s(p) = ps requires rL(p) < 1 for any p ∈ R
as per (2)), those that are revealed carry no useful information whatsoever and have no effect on
[strategic] consumers’ behavior. Furthermore, revealing bad reviews in that setting has no value
to either the seller or the consumers, so all equilibria are payoff-equivalent to the fully censored
equilibrium.20 Therefore, all following results rely on nonzero market presence of naive consumers.
5.5.2 Band B1
Continuing to band B1 = {p|pn ∈ [p¯, p¯)}, one should notice that starting from B1 the beliefs
may only jump to pn = ps = 1 after a good review, band B0 after a bad review, or stay in B1
forever absent any reviews. Therefore, having full knowledge of continuation equilibria in B0, we
can describe the continuation equilibria that start in B1. The parts of most interest are given by the
two following propositions. Proposition 2 states that bad reviews are only revealed in B1 if there
are sufficiently many strategic consumers in the market (µ > 12) and they are sufficiently close to
quitting the market (ps is low enough). Proposition 3 then concludes that whenever a bad review
is disclosed in B1, it strictly improves strategic consumers’ belief ps.
20The key to observing this equivalence is noting that D(p) = −q both if p /∈ R and if p ∈ R and fs(p) = ps.
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Proposition 2. For any p ∈ B1: p ∈ R only if µ > 12 and ps < p∗, where
p∗ =
p¯µ
λ
r
p¯µ
λ
r + (1− p¯)(1− µ)λr
.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium of the game fs(p) > ps for all p ∈ B1 ∩R.
By Lemma 2 the low-type seller should be indifferent between revealing and deleting a bad
review at any p ∈ B1 ∩ R. He can retain naive consumers in the market forever starting from any
p with pn > p¯ and can never bring them back to the market starting from any p with pn < p¯.
Revealing a bad review at some p ∈ B1 and losing naive consumers forever is then always worse
than deleting it and retaining naive consumers forever – even if revealing the review brings strategic
consumers to the market and retains them forever. Therefore, any reason to allow bad reviews in
B1 only arises if µ > 12 , i.e., if strategic consumers are more prevalent in the market than naive
consumers. This gives the first condition in Proposition 2.
The second condition in Proposition 2 comes from the fact that at some points p ∈ B↑1 patience
τ(p) is so large that even a jump to the most optimistic belief fs(p) = 1 – which grants the seller
sales to strategic consumers from now until eternity – is not sufficient to compensate the seller for
the loss of naive consumers. This leads to an upper bound on ps at which bad reviews may be
disclosed.
The fact that any revealed bad review trades off naive consumers’ demand for that of strategic
consumers is the basic idea behind Proposition 3: τ(p) should increase following disclosure, which
implies that ps should increase as well. This implication is not as trivial as may seem at first because
the speeds at which the belief of strategic consumers drifts toward p¯ in B0 and B1 are not the same
in general.
5.5.3 Band B2+
Analogous to before, from B2 the beliefs may only escape to pn = ps = 1 after a good review,
into B1 after a bad review, or else stay in B2 if no reviews are posted. Therefore, we can apply our
knowledge of continuation equilibria in B1 to explore the continuation equilibria originating in B2
and then unravel to include Bk with k > 2. This will conclude our analysis of the implications of
the low type’s incentives, since the set ∪k>0Bk covers the whole state space, so any equilibrium of
the game is a continuation equilibrium starting in one of these bands.
Proposition 4. In any equilibrium of the game f(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↑2+ ∩R.
While Proposition 4 may look very similar to Proposition 3, the reasoning behind it is more
subtle. Recall from Lemma 2 that the low-type seller must be indifferent between disclosing a bad
review and deleting it in all p ∈ B2+ ∩ R, so it must be that τ(p) = τ(f(p)). Consider a pair of
points p˜ ∈ B↑2 and f(p˜) ∈ B↑1 and assume for purposes of conveying intuition that all states p that
follow states p˜ and f(p˜) (in the absence of reviews, i.e., in the sense of equation (4)) belong to
R. By the martingale property of beliefs, values of f s(p) − ps and D(p) are negatively associated.
We use the informal term “expectancy” to denote the common factor underlying both values: high
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expectancy is associated with high drift speed |D(p)| (i.e., very negative D(p)) and strong reversal
f s(p)− ps, and vice versa.21
We know from Proposition 3 that f s(p)− ps > 0 for all p ∈ B1 ∩ R, so expectancy is high and
hence D(p) is strongly negative in B1. This means that strategic consumers are relatively impatient
– τ(f(p˜)) is “small.” Then suppose by contradiction that fs(p) < ps for all p ∈ B2 ∩R. This would
imply that expectancy is weak in B2. Consequently, drift speed |D(p)| is low, so strategic consumers
are patient. Together with fs(p˜) < p˜s, this leads to τ(f(p˜)) < τ(p˜) – a contradiction of indifference.
The formal proof shows that in order to restore the indifference it must be the case that fs(p) > ps
for all p ∈ B↑2 ∩ R (i.e., it cannot even be that fs(p) − ps is positive for some p and negative for
other). Iterating the same argument over bands, we then get that fs(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↑2+ ∩R.
Unlike in B1, we cannot make any hard statements about the area below the cutoff, B
↓
2+. The
reasoning for p ∈ B↑2+∩R relies on the fact that the cutoff p¯ is always reached in finite time from any
ps < 1. Under the cutoff there is no such terminal point. All states under the cutoff are inherently
similar – they all can warrant the status quo forever, where the strategic consumers are out of the
market until a good review arrives and the naive consumers buy the product forever. Therefore, as
long as the seller is guaranteed to arrive at a state with τ(p) = 0 (i.e., ps < p¯), he does not care
about the exact fs(p). This means that there is no problem in having arbitrary jumps of ps. On
the other hand, this also means that there are no impediments to constructing specific equilibria in
which fs(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↓2+ ∩R.
5.6 Characterization: High Type’s Preferences
This section investigates the high-type seller’s preferences conditional on the low type’s
indifference. In doing so we retrace the same path over bands that we followed in the second
step of the proof of Theorem 1. In B↑0 Corollary 2 states that all continuation equilibria at any
p ∈ B↑0 are payoff-equivalent: when all bad reviews are completely uninformative, it does not make
much difference whether any of them are revealed on an equilibrium path or not.
The key insight into the high type’s incentives lies in B↓1 . In any state p ∈ B↓1∩R, the seller with
a bad review in hand faces the following choice. Deleting the review can retain naive consumers in
the market forever but cannot attract strategic consumers. Revealing the review, on the other hand,
brings strategic consumers to the market for some time τ(f(p)), but drives the naive consumers
away. Figure 2 demonstrates this trade-off graphically, showing “expected sales per consumer” as
a function of time for the two strategies outlined above. Time zero on the graph corresponds to
states p or f(p) respectively. This graph is valid for all p ∈ B1 ∩ R, so one should remember that
τ(p) = 0 for all p ∈ B↓1 .
The low-type seller must be indifferent between deleting and revealing a bad review at any
p ∈ B1∩R, meaning that expected sales in the absence of future reviews should be equal in the two
scenarios.22 Visually, it means that the areas under the two intertemporal demand curves in Figure
2 should be equal (after discounting future sales appropriately). The graph makes it obvious why
µ > 12 is necessary to render the low type indifferent in B1 (and thus generate a strategy profile
21Although drift speed |D(p)| and degree of reversal fs(p)− ps are not connected one-to-one, what matters for the
argument is that D(p) > (>)− q if and only if fs(p)− ps 6 (<)0 (see Lemma 3).
22It is enough to consider the case when no reviews arrive after p because the low type can never receive good
reviews and always weakly prefers to delete bad reviews so deleting all future bad reviews is an optimal strategy.
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Figure 2: Intertemporal demand starting from some p ∈ B1 ∩R and f(p).
with nonempty B1 ∩R) – otherwise deleting the review and staying at p is strictly better.
We next argue that the high type prefers to reveal at p ∈ B1 ∩R, conditional on the low type’s
indifference. To see this, note that the only difference between the payoffs of the two types is the
option value of receiving a good review for the high-type seller. Because a good review generates
the best possible continuation payoff (all consumers buying forever), the high type prefers that this
good review arrives sooner rather than later. The rate of arrival of reviews is exactly proportional
to sales per consumer. Therefore, conditional on total expected discounted sales being the same in
both scenarios (to satisfy the low type’s indifference), the high-type seller prefers to frontload sales.
In other words, he wants to sell as much product as possible early on in an attempt to generate a
good review as early as possible. By looking at Figure 2 it is easy to see that if τ(p) = 0 – which
is the case for all p ∈ B↓1 , – then revealing a bad review and jumping to f(p) generates a more
frontloaded demand schedule than deleting a bad review and staying at p. The high type prefers to
reveal the bad review because it makes the first good review arrive sooner on average.
At the same time, this can be seen as a costly signaling story. The high-type seller strictly
prefers to reveal a bad review and lose naive consumers because this is less costly for him than for
the low type. In particular, the high type knows that with positive probability he will receive a
good review in the future, which will bring naive consumers back to the market. On the other hand,
the fact that revealing a bad review is less costly for the high type than for the low type makes this
signal credible for strategic consumers, who then react positively to bad reviews.
One can see from Figure 2 that the reasoning for B↓1 presented above also extends by continuity
to p ∈ B↑1 ∩R as long as τ(p) is low enough. However, it does not need to extend all the way to p∗
as given by Proposition 2, meaning that the high type’s incentives may provide a tighter bound on
ps for which bad reviews can be revealed in B1.
Finally, this preference to reveal bad reviews extends from B1 to B2+ (as long as B1 ∩ R is
non-trivial). The intuition is as follows. Deleting or revealing a bad review in any p ∈ B2+ ∩R has
no immediate effect: it affects neither the naive consumers’ decision to purchase the product, nor
22
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Figure 3: An example of equilibrium with strict reversal.
the strategic consumers’ patience τ(p) (which again follows from Lemma 2). However, revealing a
bad review – and sufficiently many bad reviews after it – will bring the high-type seller to some
p′ ∈ B1. With positive probability he can then receive another bad review in some p′′ ∈ B1 ∩ R
and reveal it, which, as we have established above, is a strictly preferred option. Thus revealing a
bad review at p ∈ B2+ ∩R is strictly better than deleting it because it gives the high-type seller a
chance to eventually arrive at B0, which he strictly prefers to staying in B1 and, by analogy, B2+.
5.7 Existence Example
The argument in 5.6 implies that the strategy profile akin to the one represented in Figure 3 (the
formal construction is in the Appendix) could constitute an equilibrium. In particular, this is exactly
the equilibrium that is constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. The orange shaded region, which
includes B0, most of B
↑
1 , and the line {p|pn > p¯, ps = p¯}, is the set (0, 1) × (0, 1)\R where no bad
reviews are ever revealed. The white region is the revelation set R = {B1|ps < p¯+ε}∪{B2+|ps 6= p¯}
for some ε. The argument above has shown that equilibrium conditions (low type’s indifference and
high type’s preference to reveal) can be satisfied for all p within such R.23 The purple dotted lines
show the set of states p that are on equilibrium path given p0. The blue arrows create a “phase
diagram,” pointing from p to f(p) for some selected p ∈ R.
We now want to show that the equilibrium with the revelation set R described above can satisfy
the two properties we are seeking: it generates payoffs that are different from the fully censored
equilibrium and it generates strict reversal in all p ∈ R. We will start with the latter. We have
B0 ∩ R = ∅, and Proposition 3 already gives strict reversal for all p ∈ B1 ∩ R. Therefore, it is
23Incentives for p /∈ R are trivial due to our assumption that off the equilibrium path pγ = 0 for either consumer
type γ.
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only left to show strict reversal for B2+. In the case of p ∈ B↓2+ any action profile can satisfy
the equilibrium conditions as long as fs(p) < p¯, so we can easily construct it in such a way that
f s(p) > ps. Finally, the channel through which reversal works in B↑2+ has been described in section
5.5.3. Importantly, that channel relied on high expectancy (i.e., high drift speeds |D(p)|) in B↑1 ,
which in turn requires B↑1 ∩ R 6= ∅. Therefore, it is important to include the ε-slice of B↑1 in our
revelation set R to generate strict reversal in B↑2+.
The other property – payoff-nonequivalence – is easy to deduct given the strict reversal. In fully
censored equilibrium D(p) = −q for all p. In the equilibrium we have constructed, f s(p) > ps for
almost all p ∈ B↑2+, which by Lemma 3 implies that D(p) < −q for all p. Using representation
(9) of τ(p), we immediately obtain that for any given p ∈ B2+ (with ps > p¯), strategic consumers’
patience τ(p) is lower in the equilibrium we have constructed than in the fully censored equilibrium.
From Lemma 2 and the consequent optimality of deleting all bad reviews for the low-type seller,
one can then conclude that V L(p) is also lower for such p in the equilibrium of Figure 3 than in the
fully censored equilibrium.
6 Discussion and Extensions
This section presents additional observations resulting from our model, which are not directly
related to Theorems 1 and 2. We then consider some extensions of the baseline model.
6.1 Seller’s Profit
One topic that persists throughout the model is multiplicity of equilibria, which differ in terms
of R – the set of states at which bad reviews are revealed on the equilibrium path. It is then
natural to ask which types of players prefer which equilibria. Theorem 2 says that in case µ 6 12
all equilibria are payoff-equivalent. Therefore, from this point onward assume that µ ∈ (12 , 1).
Proposition 5 below addresses the question of seller’s profit. The next subsection discusses issues
related to consumers’ welfare.
In general, multiple equilibria may exist with the same revelation set R, and payoff comparison
across such equilibria is ambiguous. Therefore, we employ the following equilibrium selection.
Definition 2. An equilibrium (rL(p), rH(p)) is called semi-separating if rH(p) = 1 for all p ∈ R.
This class of equilibria is non-empty, since our constructive proof of the second part of Theorem 2
presents one such equilibrium.24 As discussed above, Corollary 1 directly implies that at any p ∈ R
we have rH(p) > rL(p) > 0, so the high-type seller should at least weakly prefer to disclose a bad
review at p. The refinement above then only rules out the case when the high-type seller is exactly
indifferent and deletes bad reviews with positive probability.
Proposition 5. Suppose that µ ∈ (12 , 1) and consider two semi-separating equilibria with revelation
sets R′ and R′′ ⊂ R′, respectively. Then the low-type seller weakly prefers equilibrium with R′′ to
equilibrium with R′ at all p.
24In fact, if there exists some equilibrium with a given R, then there exists a semi-separating equilibrium with that
R.
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Larger R means more bad reviews are revealed in equilibrium, but it also leads to higher
expectancy, making strategic consumers less patient. The latter implies the larger is R, the smaller
is τ(p) for all p ∈ B↑, which in turn makes the low-type seller strictly worse off at those states.
As for the high-type seller, he [weakly] benefits from revealing bad reviews, so he prefers equilibria
with larger B↓1+ ∩ R conditional on f(p) being the same in both equilibria for all p ∈ B↓1+ ∩ R.
However, in B↑1+ the two effects described above – less-patient consumers given larger R but more
opportunities to reveal a bad review – work in the opposite directions, so the high type’s final
preferences are ambiguous.
6.2 Asymptotic Learning
The expected utility of a consumer arriving at time t would depend on reviews revealed up to t
and is thus tough to measure, even in expectation. However, it is possible to make limit statements.
This subsection examines whether the seller’s type is learned by the consumers asymptotically as
t→ +∞.
Assume that p0 > p¯ to avoid triviality. We say that the seller’s type is asymptotically learned
by consumers of type γ if the probability that the purchase decision made by consumer of type γ is
correct if it approaches 1 as t → +∞.25 Asymptotic learning is trivially connected to the welfare
of consumers who arrive sufficiently late: if the seller’s type is learned, then consumers have full
information and thus make efficient purchasing decisions. Not perfectly identifying either type of
seller is associated with losses from either buying a low-quality product or not buying a high-quality
product.
The bad news for consumers is that learning both sellers’ types, by the design of our information
structure, is impossible in any equilibrium. To see this, suppose there exists some time t such that
absent a good review, both types of consumers stop buying the product by time t with positive
probability. With probability e−λqt > 0, a high-type seller receives no good review by time t,
meaning that with positive probability consumers stop purchasing a high-quality product. On the
other hand, if no such time t exists, then consumers never stop buying a low-quality product.
Therefore, in any equilibrium at most one type of seller can be identified by all consumers.
In the absence of good reviews, strategic consumers always stop purchasing the product in finite
time, so they always reveal a low-type seller. Therefore, they can reveal a high-type seller if and
only if naive consumers stay in the market forever so that a good review eventually arrives. In
this case the naive consumers also reveal a high-type seller. This happens only if sufficiently many
bad reviews are deleted (which is the case in all equilibria if µ < 12). Conversely, if sufficiently
many bad reviews are revealed in equilibrium (R is sufficiently dense), then absent a good review,
naive consumers also stop buying the product almost surely as t→ +∞. In this case they reveal a
low-type seller, but neither group of consumers is guaranteed to reveal a high-type seller.
6.3 General Information Structures
Following the literature on experimentation, we have adopted the “conclusive good news”
structure in our model, so that any good review is a conclusive evidence of θ = H. However, it has
25Correct decision is purchasing the product if and only if it is of high quality. Asymptotic mislearning is related
to herding on suboptimal alternatives, see Banerjee [1992], Bikhchandani et al. [1992].
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been noted that in experimentation models some interesting results disappear with the transition
to “conclusive bad news” case (see, e.g., Keller and Rady [2015], Halac and Kremer [2017]). In the
context of our model this information structure would mean that both types of sellers can generate
good reviews but only the low-type seller can receive bad reviews. The following proposition says
that in this case no bad reviews are ever revealed.
Proposition 6. In all equilibria under “conclusive bad news” R = ∅.
The intuition behind the proposition is trivial. Under conclusive bad news, any bad review
reveals to all future consumers that θ = L, meaning they have no reason to buy the product.
Therefore, revealing any bad review is a weakly dominated strategy, and a short proof shows that
it is actually strictly dominated.
Of course, possible information structures are not exhausted by the conclusive news cases.
Another setting we explore below is one where both good and bad reviews are inconclusive. In
particular, consider a “general” setting, defined as follows: the low-quality product yields utility 1
with probability qL+ and utility 0 with probability qL− = 1− qL+. The respective probabilities for the
high-quality product are qH+ and qH− = 1− qH+ , with qH+ > qL+. Let p¯ be such that
p¯qH+ + (1− p¯)qL+ = c.
Denote bad and good reviews in this setting as l ∈ {−,+} respectively. Let rθ−(p) and rθ+(p) denote
the probability with which seller of type θ reveals a bad review and a good review, respectively, in
state p. Let Rl := {p|(rHl (p), rLl (p)) 6= (0, 0)} for l ∈ {−,+}. Let fγl (p) denote the belief of type-γ
consumer who observes a review l ∈ {−,+} posted in state p.
Note that even though this “general” setting is binary, for purposes of our result any setting
with more than two reviews/utility levels can be reduced to this general setting by banning (i.e.,
setting Rl = ∅ for) all but two reviews. For simplicity we also assume that qH+ · qH− > qL+ · qL− (so
that fn+(f−(p)) > pn), but this is not a vital assumption.
The following proposition says that in this setting we can still construct an equilibrium in which
all revealed bad reviews (and good reviews alike) improve the seller’s reputation among strategic
consumers – and again bad reviews are revealed in a nonempty set of states in a payoff-relevant
way.
Proposition 7. If µ ∈ (12 , 1), then there exists an equilibrium in the general setting such that
1. f sl (p) > p
s for all p ∈ Rl and all l ∈ {−,+};
2. R− 6= ∅;
3. this equilibrium is payoff-distinct from fully censored equilibrium.
Fully censored equilibrium in this case can mean either one with R− = R+ = ∅ (i.e., one in which
all good and bad reviews are censored), or one with R− = ∅ and same R+ as in the equilibrium under
consideration. The latter definition ensures that payoff-nonequivalence is driven by differences in
R− and not R+.26
26One can also compare the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 7 to the one with R− = ∅ and R+ = [0, 1]2
with similar results.
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The equilibrium constructed in the proof is somewhat more restrictive than that in Theorem
2. In particular, the construction involves R− = B
↓
1+ and R+ = B
↑
−1 (where B−1 = {(pn, ps) ∈
B0|(fn−)−1(pn) > p¯}). The important part is that the equilibrium constructed in the proof of
Proposition 7 still exhibits relevant economic forces. In particular, now both seller types can bring
naive consumers back to the market after driving them out, but this is still cheaper for the high-type
seller because he faces a higher rate of arrival of good reviews. Consequently, the high type is more
willing to lose naive consumers in the first place, which enables bad reviews’ signaling function for
strategic consumers.
6.4 Fake Reviews
Suppose that in addition to reviews written by consumers, the seller is able to post fake reviews
of his choice. As we show below, our main result (Theorem 2) survives in this case.
Adopt the general setting presented in the previous subsection. Suppose that now the seller
also receives opportunities to post any fake review he wants (good or bad) in addition to releasing
consumers’ real reviews. Future consumers cannot distinguish real reviews and fake reviews. Fake
review opportunities arrive with some finite Poisson intensity λφ, which serves as a proxy for the
cost of posting a fake review.27 This rate λφ can be arbitrarily high.
For simplicity we impose the same assumptions on fake review opportunities as we do on
censorable reviews. Most importantly, opportunities are perishable: given that an opportunity
has arrived in some state p, the seller has to decide whether to exercise it immediately, otherwise
the opportunity vanishes. The seller also cannot delete fake reviews that he posted in the past.
Let φθl (p) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which seller of type θ fakes review l ∈ {−,+} in
state p given that the opportunity. An obvious restriction is φθ−(p) + φθ+(p) 6 1 for any θ, p.
A type-θ seller’s strategy in the fake reviews setting is then given by {rθl , φθl }l∈{−,+}. Rational
consumers’ beliefs are updated as
f sl (p)
1− f sl (p)
=
ps
1− ps ·
λqHl r
H(p) + λφφ
H
l (p)
λqLl r
L(p) + λφφ
L
l (p)
(6)
after review l ∈ {−,+}, and as
p˙s = ps (1− ps) ·
λ ∑
l∈{−,+}
[
qHl
(
1− rHl (p)
)− qLl (1− rLl (p))]− λφ ∑
l∈{−,+}
[
φHl (p)− φLl (p)
] (7)
in the absence of reviews. We assume that naive consumers ignore the possibility of fake reviews
in the same way that they ignore censorship; hence their belief pn is still frozen in the absence of
reviews, and their reaction to review l is given by
fnl (p)
1− fnl (p)
=
ps
1− ps ·
qHl
qLl
. (8)
To show that our main result survives in this setting, we take the equilibrium constructed in the
27We interpret the low opportunity arrival rate λφ as high posting cost, which makes the seller reluctant to post
fake reviews very frequently, and vice versa.
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proof of Proposition 7 and show that an analogous strategy profile is an equilibrium in fake reviews
setting.
Proposition 8. If µ ∈ (12 , 1), then there exists an equilibrium in the general setting with fake
reviews such that
1. f sl (p) > p
s for all p ∈ Rl and all l ∈ {−,+};
2. R− 6= ∅;
3. this equilibrium is payoff-distinct from fully censored equilibrium.
Fully censored equilibrium here has the same possible meanings as in Proposition 7. The
equilibrium constructed in the proof features φθ+(p) = 1 whenever p ∈ R+, i.e., both types of
seller post fake positive reviews at every opportunity. This dilutes the positive signal contained in
good reviews but does not eliminate it completely: fs+(p) > ps but fs+(p)→ ps as λφ →∞.
More interestingly, the equilibrium also features φH− (p) = 1 for all p ∈ R−: the high type strictly
prefers to post fake negative reviews for his own product.28 This is because, as in the baseline
model, the low-type seller is always indifferent between revealing bad reviews and deleting them,
while the high type extracts a strictly positive value from signaling through bad reviews (at least in
B↓1+). The high-type seller writes fake bad reviews only so that he can impress strategic consumers
with them. Strategic consumers then do indeed improve their opinion about product quality, even
despite (and actually thanks to) the fact that they are fully aware that bad reviews they observe
are likely fake and do not stem from any consumer’s actual experience.
7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the presence of naive consumers in the market may incentivize
the seller to reveal bad reviews even in the presence of an opportunity to costlessly delete them.
We show that bad reviews in this setting can be used as a signaling device by the seller with a
high-quality product. Revealing bad reviews hurts sales to naive consumers, which he can regain
through good reviews more easily than a seller with a low-quality product. This extra information
contained in the fact that a bad review was not deleted makes strategic consumers perceive bad
reviews more favorably than in the absence of censorship. Furthermore, this between-the-lines
information outweighs the inherent negativity of the review, making strategic consumers improve
their opinion about the product upon observing a bad review.
Important simplifying assumptions incorporated in the model include the seller’s monopoly in
the market and his inability to set the price freely, which are in some sense contradictory. Whether
the effects demonstrated in this paper survive under competition and/or free pricing of the product
is a possible direction for future work.
28To clarify, the two features – φθ+(p) = 1 whenever p ∈ R+ and φH− (p) = 1 whenever p ∈ R− – can coexist in the
constructed equilibrium because R− ∩R+ = ∅.
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Appendix
All statements below fix some strategy profile (rL(p), rH(p))p∈[0,1]2 , which in turn produces functions
D(p) and fs(p). Some statements further require this strategy profile to constitute an equilibrium.
Lemmas 1 and 2 are used heavily throughout the Appendix. They are monolithic in essence, but it
proved more convenient to stagger their proofs for different bands, since they use different supplementary
results.
Lemma 3. 1. D(p) ∈ [−1,−q) if and only if fs(p) > ps.
2. D(p) = −q if and only if either fs(p) = ps or rH(p) = rL(p) = 0.
3. D(p) ∈ (−q, 1− q] if and only if fs(p) < ps.
Proof. To show the first claim, observe that D(p) < −q is equivalent to
(1− q) · (1− rH(p))− (1− rL(p)) < −q
⇔ (1− q) · rH(p)− rL(p) > 0
⇔
(
fs(p)
1− fs(p)
)
·
(
ps
1− ps
)−1
≡ (1− q) · r
H(p)
rL(p)
> 1.
Two other claims can be obtained by reversing the inequalities or equating both sides. Finally, if
rH(p) = rL(p) = 0, then (4) directly gives that D(p) = (1− q)− 1 = −q.
Lemma 4. For any k > 0 the following hold:
1. For all p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑k, if there exists p˜ = (pn, p˜s) with p˜s ∈ [p¯, ps] and D(p˜) > 0, then τ(p) = +∞.
Otherwise τ(p) can be represented as
τ(p) = −
psˆ
p¯
1
λz(1− z) · pi(pn, z)D(pn, z)dz. (9)
2. For any p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑k, if D(pn, p˜s) < 0 for all p˜s ∈ [p¯, ps] and τ(p) < +∞, then τ(pn, ·) is
differentiable in its second argument at ps.29
29At p with ps = p¯ by the derivative of τ(pn, ·) we understand its right derivative.
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3. If D(p) 6 −ε < 0 for all p ∈ B↑k, then τ(p) is finite for all p ∈ B↑k.
4. Suppose g(p) : B↑k → [p¯, 1] is defined indirectly as τ (fn(pn), g(p)) = ψ (τ(p)) for some differentiable
and strictly increasing function ψ, and τ(p) is finite for any p ∈ B↑k ∪ B↑k−1 with ps < 1, strictly
increasing and differentiable in ps on [p¯, 1).30 Then g(p) is a strictly increasing and differentiable
function of ps. In particular, we have the following representation:
ln
(
g(p)
1− g(p)
)
= J(p) + ln
(
ps
1− ps
)
where J(p) is a differentiable function of ps.
Proof. 1. If there exists p˜ = (pn, p˜s) with p˜s ∈ [p¯, ps] and D(p˜) > 0, then pt never reaches B↓k , so
τ(p) = +∞ by definition. Now let pst denote the solution to (4) with the initial condition ps0 = ps. If
D(pn, p˜s) < 0 for all p˜s ∈ [p¯, ps], pst is a strictly decreasing function of t. Therefore, there exists an
inverse function t(pst ) measuring the time it takes for belief to drift from the initial value ps to pst . Its
derivative is given by
dt(pst )
dpst
= (λpst (1− pst ) · pi(pn, pst )D(pn, pst ))−1 ,
and t(ps) = 0. Therefore, t(pst ) =
pst´
ps
1
λz(1−z)·pi(pn,z)D(pn,z)dz. As D(p¯) < 0, the threshold is crossed in
zero time. Then substituting pst = p¯ we get the result.31
2. If D(pn, p˜s) < 0 for all p˜s ∈ [p¯, ps], then representation (9) is valid. Taking the derivative with respect
to ps we get
dτ(p)
dps
= − (λps(1− ps) · pi(pn, ps)D(pn, ps))−1 . (10)
As long as 0 < p¯ 6 ps < 1 and D(pn, ps) < 0, the derivative is finite and positive.
3. In case D(p) 6 −ε < 0 the improper integral in (9) converges for any p and therefore τ(p) < +∞.
4. Differentiability of g(p) follows directly from the differentiability and monotonicity of a composition
and an inverse function. Differentiability of J(p) is then straightforward as ln
(
g(p)
1−g(p)
)
− ln
(
ps
1−ps
)
is
a sum of differentiable functions and is therefore differentiable.
Band B0
Lemma 5. 1. D(p) > −q + ε for some ε ∈ (0, q] implies ln
(
fs(p)
1−fs(p)
)
− ln
(
ps
1−ps
)
6 ln(1− ε).
2. D(p) 6 −q − ε for some ε ∈ (0, 1− q] implies ln
(
fs(p)
1−fs(p)
)
− ln
(
ps
1−ps
)
> ln(1 + ε).
Proof. We prove only the first claim, the second one is analogous. D(p) > −q + ε implies
−(1− q) · rH(p) + rL(p) > ε
and further
ln
(
fs(p)
1− fs(p)
)
− ln
(
ps
1− ps
)
= ln
(
(1− q) · rH(p)
rL(p)
)
6 ln
(
1− ε
rL(p)
)
6 ln(1− ε).
30If p ∈ B0, then we let Bk−1 = Bk = B0.
31This proof does not imply that the integral converges. Hence even if D(pn, p˜s) < 0 for all p˜s ∈ [p¯, ps], it may still
be that τ(p) = +∞.
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Proof of Lemma 1 for p ∈ B↑0 . Suppose there exists p˜ = (p˜n, p˜s) ∈ B↑0 with τ(p˜) = +∞. Then consider
points pinf,1 := (p˜n, psinf,1) and pinf,2 := (f
n(p˜n), psinf,2), where p
s
inf,1 = inf{ps|τ(p˜n, ps) = +∞} and
psinf,2 = inf{ps|τ(fn(p˜n), ps) = +∞}.32 We start by showing that
ln
(
psinf,1
1− psinf,1
)
− ln
(
psinf,2
1− psinf,2
)
> − ln
(
1− q
2
)
. (11)
By Lemma 4 there can be three (mutually non-exclusive) sub-cases to consider.
Case 1: D(pinf,1) > 0. Then τ(pinf,1) = +∞, and rL(pinf,1) > 0.33 Therefore, a low-type seller must
weakly prefer to disclose a bad review, and thus τ(f(pinf,1)) = +∞. Then psinf,2 6 fs(pinf,1) by definition
of psinf,2, and ln
(
fs(pinf,1)
1−fs(pinf,1)
)
− ln
(
psinf,1
1−psinf,1
)
6 ln(1− q) by Lemma 5, which together imply (11).
Case 2: D(pinf,1) < 0 and there exists a sequence of points {p˜sk} such that p˜sk ↓ psinf,1 and D(p˜k) > − 1k ,
where p˜k := (p˜n, p˜sk). Then for any ε > 0 and sufficiently high K we have D(p˜K) > − q4 , rL(p˜K) > 0, and
ln
(
p˜sK
1−p˜sK
)
− ln
(
psinf,1
1−psinf,1
)
< ε. As τ(p˜K) = +∞ and rL(p˜K) > 0, we must have τ(f(p˜K)) = +∞, and
therefore pinf,2 6 f(p˜K). Finally, by Lemma 5 we then have ln
(
fs(p˜K)
1−fs(p˜K)
)
− ln
(
p˜sK
1−p˜sK
)
6 ln
(
1− 3q4
)
. It is
then true that
ln
(
psinf,1
1− psinf,1
)
− ln
(
psinf,2
1− psinf,2
)
> ln
(
p˜sK
1− p˜sK
)
− ε− ln
(
fs(p˜K)
1− fs(p˜K)
)
> − ln
(
1− 3q
4
)
− ε.
The last term is greater than − ln (1− q2) for sufficiently small ε.
Case 3: D(pinf,1) < 0 and there exists a sequence of points {p˜sk} such that p˜sk ↑ psinf,1 and
k < τ(p˜k) < +∞, where p˜k := (p˜n, p˜sk). As τ(pinf,1) = +∞ in this sub-case and τ(p˜k) < +∞, for any
k there exists pˆk = (p˜n, pˆsk) with pˆ
s
k ∈ [p˜sk, psinf,1] such that τ(pˆk) > k and D(pˆk) > − 1k . Note that
pˆk → pinf,1 as k → +∞. Now suppose (11) does not hold. Fix some arbitrary δ > 0. For any δ > 0 we
have τ(fn(p˜n), psinf,2− δ)) < +∞, so we can find k > 4q such that τ(pˆk) > τ(fn(p˜n), psinf,2− δ)). By Lemma
5 we know that ln
(
fs(pˆk)
1−fs(pˆk)
)
− ln
(
pˆsk
1−pˆsk
)
6 ln
(
1− 3q4
)
. As rL(pˆsk) > 0, we must have τ(f(pˆk)) > τ(pˆk),
and therefore by the monotonicity of τ(fn(p˜n), ps) in its second argument we must have fs(pˆk) > psinf,2− δ.
However,
ln
(
fs(pˆk)
1− fs(pˆk)
)
− ln
(
psinf,2
1− psinf,2
)
< ln
(
1− 3q
4
)
− ln
(
1− q
2
)
< 0,
which implies that fs(pˆk) < psinf,2, and by taking sufficiently small δ we achieve a contradiction.
Having shown (11), consider the sequence {pinf,k} where pinf,k :=
(
(fn)k−1(p˜n), psinf,k
)
and psinf,k =
inf{ps|τ ((fn)k−1(p˜n), ps) = +∞}. Equation (11) then implies that psinf,k < p¯ for all k > M :=⌈
ln
(
pinf,1
1−pinf,1
)
ln(1− q2 )
⌉
, i.e., we have pinf,k ∈ B↓0 , and there exists εk > 0 such that p ∈ B↓0 for all p = (pninf,k, ps)
with ps ∈ [psinf,k, psinf,k + εk). However, by definition we have τ(p) = 0 for all p ∈ B↓0 , which brings us to a
contradiction with the definition of pinf,M .
Proof of Lemma 2 for p ∈ B↑0 . Proofs for this and other regions proceed by contradiction: we show that
the low-type seller can neither have strict preference towards revealing a review (rL(p) = 1), nor towards
deleting a review (rL(p) = 0).
Suppose that at some p ∈ B↑0 ∩R a low-type seller strictly prefers to reveal a bad review, i.e., rL(p) = 1.
Then D(p) > 0 and τ(p) = +∞, which contradicts Lemma 1 for B↑0 . If rL(p) = 0 and rH(p) > 0 instead,
32As the set is non-empty and bounded from below by p¯, the infimum exists.
33The latter is true because if rL(pinf,1) = 0, then D(pinf,1) 6 −q.
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then revealing a bad review brings the maximal continuation profit to a low-type seller, while deleting it
yields strictly less if no new bad review arrives in time τ(p), which is finite by Lemma 1 for all p ∈ B↑0 , so the
probability of this happening is strictly positive. That contradicts rL(p) = 0. As rL(p) < 1 for all p ∈ B↑0 , we
have that a low-type seller weakly prefers to conceal a bad review at every point in B↑0 . Therefore, the value
of a low-type seller is equal to the value he gets by deleting all further bad reviews: V L(p) =
τ(p)´
0
e−rt · µdt.
As V L(p) = V L(f(p)), we must then have τ(p) = τ(f(p)).
For further proofs we introduce a new object: the average drift at state p = (pn, ps) is defined as
D¯(p) :=
1
λpi(p)τ(p)
(
ln
(
ps
1− ps
)
− ln
(
p¯
1− p¯
))
.
By Lemma 4 τ(p) is differentiable in ps, and by Lemma 1 for B↑0 , in any equilibrium τ(p) < +∞ for all
p ∈ B↑0 . Therefore, in any equilibrium D¯(p) is well defined in B↑0 and is differentiable with respect to ps for
any ps < 1. Lemma 2 for B↑0 also states that τ(p) = τ(f(p)), and therefore function J(p) is well-defined for
all p ∈ B↑0 by Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. 1. Suppose there exists a point p˜ = (p˜n, p˜s) ∈ B↑0 such that D¯(p˜) 6 −q − ε for some
ε ∈ (0, 1 − q]. Then there exists a point pˆ = (p˜n, pˆs) with pˆs ∈ [p¯, p˜s] such that D¯(pˆ) 6 −q − ε
and J(pˆ) > ln(1 + ε).
2. Suppose there exists a point p˜ = (p˜n, p˜s) ∈ B↑0 such that D¯(p˜) > −q + ε for some ε ∈ (0, q). Then
there exists a point pˆ = (p˜n, pˆs) with pˆs ∈ [p¯, p˜s] such that D¯(pˆ) > −q + ε and J(pˆ) 6 ln(1− ε).
Proof. We only show the first statement; the second is proved analogously. Consider a set S := {ps ∈
[p¯, p˜s]|J(p˜n, ps) > ln(1 + ε)}. First, it is nonempty, as otherwise by Lemma 5 we have D(p) > −q − ε for all
p with ps ∈ [p¯, p˜s], which violates D¯(p˜) 6 −q − ε.34 Second, S is closed (as J(p) is continuous in ps) so its
upper contour sets are closed in ps. Finally, S is trivially bounded from above by p˜s. Therefore, there exists
pˆs := supS ∈ S. Moreover, for all ps > pˆs we have J(p˜n, ps) < ln(1 + ε) and, therefore, D(p˜n, ps) > −q − ε,
which implies D¯(p˜n, pˆs) 6 −q − ε. The second property of pˆs follows directly from the definition of S.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that any strategy profile that generates fs(p) = ps for all p ∈ B↑0 ∩R
constitutes an equilibrium. Indeed, by Lemma 3 fs(p) = ps implies D(p) = −q for all p, and therefore
τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑0 , making both types of sellers indifferent between disclosing and concealing a
bad review.
Proof of the converse is separated into two steps. First we show that if there exists p ∈ B↑0 ∩R such that
J(p) 6= 0, then there exists a point p˜ such that either D¯(p˜) 6 −q− ε and J(p˜) > ln(1 + ε), or D¯(p˜) > −q+ ε
and J(p˜) 6 ln(1− ε).35 Then we achieve a contradiction in both of these cases.
Step 1. Suppose there exists p ∈ B↑0 such that J(p) 6= 0. If D¯(p) 6= −q, then the claim is valid by
Lemma 6. Now suppose that D¯(p) = −q. Then as J(p) 6= 0, it must be that D¯(f(p)) 6= −q and we can
apply Lemma 6 to f(p).
Step 2. Suppose there exists p1 such that D¯(p1) 6 −q − ε and J(p1) > ln(1 + ε). Denote
K := 1+ln(1+ε)·τ(p1)−1. As τ(f(p1)) = τ(p1) andD(p) > −1, it must be that D¯(f(p1)) 6 K ·(−q−ε). Then
by Lemma 6 there exists p2 = (ps2, pn2 ) with ps2 ∈ [p¯, fs(p1)] and pn2 := fn(pn1 ) such that D¯(p2) 6 K(−q − ε)
34If D(p) 6= −q, then p ∈ R and (2) imply J(p) = ln
(
fs(p)
1−fs(p)
)
− ln
(
ps
1−ps
)
.
35Note that J(p) = 0 implies fs(p) = ps.
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and J(p2) > ln(1 + K(q + ε) − q) > ln(1 + ε). Iterating this procedure M := [− logK(q + ε)] + 1 times we
achieve a point pM such that D¯(pM ) 6 KM (−q − ε) < −1, which is impossible.
Alternatively, suppose there exists p1 such that D¯(p1) > −q+ε and J(p1) 6 ln(1−ε). Then as τ(f(p1)) =
τ(p1) and J(p1) < 0, it must be that D¯(f(p1)) > −q + ε. Then by Lemma 6 there exists p2 = (ps2, pn2 ) with
ps2 ∈ [p¯, fs(p1)] and pn2 := fn(pn1 ) such that D¯(p2) > −q + ε and J(p2) 6 ln(1 − ε). At the same time,
ln
(
ps2
1−ps2
)
− ln
(
ps1
1−ps1
)
< ln(1 − ε). Iterating this procedure M :=
[(
ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)
− ln
(
ps1
1−ps1
))
· 1ln(1−ε)
]
+ 1
times we achieve a point pM = (psM , p
n
M ) such that p
s
M < p¯ and τ(pM ) = τ(p1), – a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 2. Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 imply that D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B0 in any equilibrium.
Therefore, (9) states that τ(p) for any given p must be the same in any equilibrium. Representation (5) then
implies that the same is true for V L(p). The high type’s value V H(p) is also the same in any equilibrium,
since it can be written for p ∈ B0 as
V H(p) =
τ(p)ˆ
0
e−rt
(
µ+ (1− µ) · (1− e−λqµt)) dt+ +∞ˆ
τ(p)
e−rt
(
1− e−λqµτ(p)
)
dt
=
µ (r + λq)
r(r + λqµ)
·
(
1− e−(r+λqµ)τ(p)
)
.
Finally, consumers’ behavior and, hence, payoffs are always the same at a given p in any equilibrium.
Therefore, for a given p ∈ B0 all players’ payoffs are the same in any equilibrium.
Band B1
Lemma 7. If µ < 12 , then B1 ∩R = ∅.
Proof. If p ∈ B1 then the low-type seller can guarantee himself
V L(p) > 1− µ
r
+ (1− e−rτ(p)) · µ
r
>
1− µ
r
by deleting all future reviews and retaining naive consumers forever and strategic consumers for time τ(p).
Disclosing any bad review makes naive consumers quit the market until a good review arrives (which is never
for a low-type seller), so
V L(f(p)) = (1− e−rτ(f(p))) · µ
r
6 µ
r
.
As one can see, if µ < 12 , then V
L(f(p)) < V L(p), hence the low-type seller is never willing to disclose a bad
review.
Proof of Lemma 2 for p ∈ B1. Whenever µ < 12 , by Lemma 7 we have B1 ∩ R = ∅ so the statement is
trivially true. Thus from now on assume µ > 12 . We divide the proof into two parts corresponding to two
subregions of B1.
Case 1: p ∈ B↓1 . There it must be that (1 − q) · rH(p) > rL(p), as by sacrificing the pool of
naive consumers any seller must gain the pool of strategic consumers for at least some period of time,
so fs(p) > p¯ > ps. In particular, this implies that rL(p) = 1 is not possible in any equilibrium.
As for the second case, suppose instead that rL(p) = 0 and rH(p) > 0. Then any single bad review
reveals a high-type seller and trades off the pool of naive consumers for the whole pool of strategic consumers
forever. Either group under the respective scenario stays on the marker forever, and the other group joins
after a good review. Thus rL(p) = 0 is optimal for the low-type seller only if µ = 12 . In that case the
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low-type seller is indifferent between disclosing a bad review and concealing it. If, however, µ > 12 , then the
combination of rL(p) = 0 and rH(p) > 0 is impossible, and thus rL(p) > 0.
Case 2: p ∈ B↑1 . If µ = 12 , then a strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium in B↑1 if and only if
rH(p) = rL(p) = 0 for points with ps > p¯, and rL(pn, p¯) = 0. At p¯ the low-type seller can then retain one
and only one of two types of consumers on the market while another is driven out forever, and he is therefore
indifferent between revealing and deleting (but in equilibrium deletes all bad reviews).
Thus for the remainder of the proof we assume that µ > 12 and consider p ∈ B↑1 ∩R. If rL(p) = 1, then
D(p) > 0, so staying silent at p gives the maximum possible continuation payoff to any seller. At the same
time, following disclosure any seller loses naive consumers for at least some time and therefore gets strictly
less, – a contradiction with rL(p) = 1.
We are left to show that the low-type seller cannot strictly prefer to delete a bad review. Suppose by
way of contradiction that there exists p˜ ∈ B↑1 such that rL(p˜) = 0 and rH(p˜) > 0. Then fs(p˜) = 1. It implies
that for all p ∈ {(p˜n, ps)|ps > p˜s} it must be that rH(p) = rL(p) = 0, as otherwise a seller should receive a
strictly higher payoff by disclosing at p than at p˜, which is impossible given fn(p) < p¯. Therefore, if such p˜
exists, then it is unique and τ(f(p˜)) = +∞. Moreover, non-disclosure is on path in this and all future states,
thus deleting this and all future bad reviews must be weakly better for the low-type seller than disclosing a
bad review at p and all further bad reviews afterwards:
+∞ˆ
0
e−rt(1− µ)dt+
τ(p)ˆ
0
e−rtµdt >
τ(f(p))ˆ
0
e−rtµdt
⇔ 1− µ
µ
+ e−rτ(f(p)) > e−rτ(p). (12)
On the other hand, the high-type seller’s value from disclosing a bad review at p is
V H (f(p)) =
τ(f(p))ˆ
0
e−rt
(
µ+ (1− µ) · (1− e−λqµt)) dt+ +∞ˆ
τ(f(p))
e−rt
(
1− e−λqµτ(f(p))
)
dt
=
µ (r + λq)
r(r + λqµ)
·
(
1− e−(r+λqµ)τ(f(p))
)
. (13)
The value that the high-type seller gets from deleting a bad review at p is at least as large as the value from
deleting all bad reviews from p onwards:
V H(p) >
τ(p)ˆ
0
e−rtdt+
+∞ˆ
τ(p)
e−rt
(
1− µe−λq(µτ(p)+(1−µ)t)
)
dt
=
1
r
·
(
1− rµ
r + λq (1− µ)e
−(r+λq)τ(p)
)
> 1
r
− µ
r + λq (1− µ) ·
(
1− µ
µ
)1+λqr
,
where the last inequality follows from (12) after recalling that τ(f(p)) = +∞. As rH(p) > 0, it must be that
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V H (f(p)) > V H(p), which implies:
µ (r + λq)
r(r + λqµ)
− 1
r
+
µ
r + λq (1− µ) ·
(
1− µ
µ
)1+λqr
> 0
⇔ 1 +
λq
r µ
1 + λqr (1− µ)
·
(
1− µ
µ
)λq
r
> 1 (14)
Note that (14) holds with equality for µ = 12 and that
(
1 + λqr x
)
(1− x)λqr is a decreasing function of x for
all x ∈ (0, 1). This means that (14) is violated whenever µ > 12 , so there does not exist any p ∈ B↑1 ∩R with
rL(p) = 0.
Finally, as rL(p) < 1 for all p ∈ B1 and a low-type seller is indifferent between disclosing and concealing
a bad review at all p ∈ B↑0 ∪B1, (12) holds with equality for all p ∈ B↑1 .
Proof of Lemma 1 for p ∈ B↑1+. We prove the claim only for B↑1 . Induction to all further bands is
straightforward. Assume the contrary. Then there exists p˜ = (p˜n, p˜s) ∈ B↑1 with τ(p˜) = +∞. Consider a
state p˜inf := (p˜n, p˜sinf ) ∈ B↑1 where p˜sinf = inf{ps|τ(p˜n, ps) = +∞}. According to Lemma 4, there can be
three sub-cases. Either D(p˜inf ) > 0, or D(p˜inf ) < 0 and there exists a sequence p˜sk converging to p˜sinf either
from below or from above such that D(p˜n, p˜sk)→ 0.
If D(p˜inf ) > 0 or p˜sk converges to p˜sinf from above, there exists pˆ such that τ(pˆ) = +∞ (i.e., no
disclosure at pˆ grants the maximal continuation payoff) and D(pˆ) > −q, with the latter implying that pˆ ∈ R.
By deleting all bad reviews the seller can retain both groups of consumers in the market forever starting
from pˆ. However, we know that V θ(f(pˆ)) is strictly smaller than the maximal possible payoff for seller of
type θ, since this is true for any p ∈ B0 with ps < 1. Revealing a bad review at pˆ is thus strictly suboptimal
for either type of the seller, which contradicts pˆ ∈ R.
If p˜sk converges to p˜
s
inf from below, then for any ε > 0 and any C > 0 there exists pˆ such that
D(pˆ) > −ε and τ(pˆ) > C. The latter property is satisfiable, as improper integral in (9) diverges, and
therefore for any C > 0 there exists some k such that τ(p˜n, p˜sinf − 1k ) > C. As for the former, we know that
τ(p˜n, p˜sinf )−τ(p˜n, p˜sinf − 1k ) = +∞, and therefore there exists pˆs ∈ [p˜sinf − 1k , p˜sinf ] such that D(p˜n, pˆs) > −ε.
As the seller’s value V θ(p) in any state p ∈ B↑0 with ps < 1 is strictly less than the maximal one and as C
can be made arbitrarily large, we can find C large enough that the value of disclosure is strictly less than
the value of staying silent. Since pˆ ∈ R as long as ε < q, we achieve a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is shown in Lemma 7 that if µ < 12 , then r
L(p) = rH(p) = 0 for all p ∈ B1 ∩R
is the only possible equilibrium strategy profile. To show the second condition, recall from Lemma 2 that a
low-type seller must be indifferent between revealing a bad review at p ∈ B↑1 and not, and that his indifference
condition can be written as
1− µ
µ
+ e−rτ(f(p)) = e−rτ(p). (15)
As τ(f(p)) 6 +∞, it should be that τ(p) 6 1r ln µ1−µ . Therefore, as D(p) > −1, we have ln p
∗
1−p∗ − ln p¯1−p¯ 6
λ
r ln
µ
1−µ which gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. The claim was already established for B↓1 in the proof of Lemma 2 for B1. We
are left to show it for B↑1 . As Lemma 4 shows, we can construct a mapping g such that
1− µ
µ
+ e−rτ(g(p)) = e−rτ(p), (16)
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so g(p) = fs(p) for all p ∈ R. Further, g(p) can be represented as
ln
(
g(p)
1− g(p)
)
= J(p) + ln
(
ps
1− ps
)
(17)
for some function J(p) which is differentiable in ps. Taking the derivative of both sides of (16) with respect
to ps, we get
e−rτ(p) · dτ(p)
dps
= e−rτ(g(p)) · dτ(g(p))
dg(p)
dg(p)
dps
. (18)
As is shown in Lemma 4, dτ(p)dps = (λp
s (1− ps)pi(p)D(p))−1. Differentiating (17) we get
dg(p)
dps
=
e−J(p) + ps(1− ps)dJ(p)dps e−J(p)[
ps + (1− ps)e−J(p)]2 .
Plugging the three derivatives, we get that (18) corresponds to
e−rτ(p) · µq = e−rτ(g(p)) · (−D(p)) ·
[
1 + ps(1− ps) · dJ(p)
dps
]
.
Plugging (16) into the expression above we get
(−D(p)) ·
[
1 + ps(1− ps) · dJ(p)
dps
]
= q ·
[
µ+ (1− µ) · erτ(g(p))
]
. (19)
Consider state (pn, p¯) ∈ B1. We know τ(pn, p¯) = 0, therefore (16) implies τ(g(pn, p¯)) > 0, which in turn
means J(pn, p¯) > 0. For any p ∈ B↑1 we have τ(g(p)) > τ(g(pn, p¯)) > 0, therefore there exists ε > 0 such that
the RHS of (19) is larger than q+ ε. If additionally dJ(p)dps < 0, (19) implies D(p) < −q− ε, and consequently
J(p) > ln(1 + ε) by Lemma 5. It then follows from continuity of J(p) in ps that J(p) > 0 for all p ∈ B↑1 . For
there to exist p ∈ B↑1 such that J(p) 6 0 there should exist p˜ such that J(p˜) ∈ (0, ln(1 + ε)) and dJ(p˜)dps < 0,
which is ruled out by the argument above.
Lemma 8. If µ > 12 , then for any set R˜ ⊆ B↓1 there exists an equilibrium with B↓1 ∩R = R˜.
Proof. As Lemma 2 states, for µ > 12 the low-type seller is indifferent between disclosing a bad review and
concealing it at all p ∈ B↓1 ∩ R. This indifference is given by (15), and using τ(p) = 0 for all p ∈ B↓1 ∩ R as
well as the fact that τ(f(p)) = 1λqµ
[
ln
(
fs(p)
1−fs(p)
)
− ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)]
it can be rewritten as36
(
p¯
1− p¯ ·
1− fs(p)
fs(p)
) r
λqµ
= 2− 1
µ
⇔ f
s(p)
1− fs(p) =
ps
1− ps ·
(1− q) · rH(p)
rL(p)
=
p¯
1− p¯
(
2− 1
µ
)−λqµr
.
Next we consider incentives of a high-type seller. Since rH(p) > 0, he should weakly prefer to reveal a
bad review. We further show that this is always true whenever µ > 12 (and the preference is strict if µ >
1
2 ),
and therefore rH(p) = 1 constitutes an equilibrium in B↓1 . The value from revealing a bad review can be
computed by plugging (15) and τ(p) = 0 into (13) to obtain
V H (f(p)) =
(
1
r
− 1− µ
r + λqµ
)
·
(
1−
(
2− 1
µ
)1+λqµr )
. (20)
36As D(p) = −q in B↑0 , the expression for τ(f(p)) follows from (9) and the fact that pi(p) = µ for p ∈ B↑0 .
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The value of staying silent at p is no greater than supremum over all T of expected payoffs from staying
silent until T and then receiving and disclosing a bad review exactly at T (with T = +∞ allowed as an
option to stay silent forever). The remainder of this proof shows that this amount is smaller than V H(f(p)),
which finalizes the argument. The supremum is equal to
V¯ = sup
T
Tˆ
0
e−rt
[
1− µ · e−λq(1−µ)t
]
dt+ e−rT
(
e−λq(1−µ)T · V H (f(pT )) +
(
1− e−λq(1−µ)T
)
· 1
r
)
.
By simplifying the expression above we obtain
V¯ = sup
T
(
1
r
− µ
r + λq(1− µ)
)
·
(
1− e−(r+λq(1−µ))T
)
+ e−(r+λq(1−µ))T · V H (f(pT )) ,
which is a convex combination of
(
1
r − µr+λq(1−µ)
)
and V H(f(pT )). The latter is given by (20) and is thus
independent of T . Therefore, to finalize the argument we need to show that
V H(f(p)) >
(
1
r
− µ
r + λq(1− µ)
)
,
which would mean that staying silent at p is weakly worse than revealing a bad review at p, and the equality
is attained only when µ = 12 . Indeed, the condition above is equivalent to
1
1 + λq(1−µ)r
·
(
2− 1
µ
)
>
(
2− 1
µ
)1+λqµr
. (21)
For µ = 12 the inequality is trivially satisfied with equality. And for µ ∈ ( 12 , 1) we have
(
1− 1− µ
µ
)λqµ
r
< e−
λq(1−µ)
r <
1
1 + λq(1−µ)r
,
which concludes the argument.
Band B2+
Proof of Lemma 2 for p ∈ B2+. Suppose not: there exists some p ∈ R at which the low-type seller has
strict preference. Depending on the direction of this preference, two cases are possible:
Case 1: rL(p) = 0, rH(p) > 0. Then fs(p) = 1 and fn(p) > p¯, so by revealing this bad review and
deleting all future ones the seller can guarantee himself the maximal possible continuation payoff. Therefore,
deleting bad review at p cannot be strictly better than leaving it – a contradiction.
Case 2: rL(p) = 1, rH(p) 6 1. It implies D(p) > 0. If ps > p¯, then this contradicts Lemma 1 for
p ∈ B↑1+. If, however, ps < p¯, then by Lemma 3 D(p) > 0 implies that fs(p) < ps for bad reviews revealed
at p, and therefore fs(p) < p¯. The low-type seller’s value from revealing a bad review in B↓1 is equal to the
value of deleting all future bad reviews starting from f(p). Deleting a bad review in B↓2 can guarantee at
least the same value by case of deleting all bad reviews. This means that despite we’ve assumed rL(p) = 1,
the low-type seller is indeed indifferent between disclosure and concealment at p.
We have shown that the low-type seller’s value at any p ∈ B2+ is equal to that from deleting all bad
reviews starting from p, and the value of disclosure at p is equal to the value he gets deleting all bad reviews
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starting from fs(p). Thus the indifference condition of the low-type seller results in
τ(p)ˆ
0
e−rtdt+ (1− µ)e−rτ(p)
+∞ˆ
0
e−rtdt =
τ(f(p))ˆ
0
e−rtdt+ (1− µ)e−rτ(f(p))
+∞ˆ
0
e−rtdt,
which can be further reduced to
τ(f(p)) = τ(p). (22)
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We show the claim for B↑2 . Induction to B
↑
k with k > 2 is straightforward.
As Lemma 4 shows, we can construct mapping g such that τ(g(p)) = τ(p), and for some function J(p)
which is continuous in ps we have:
ln
(
g(p)
1− g(p)
)
= J(p) + ln
(
ps
1− ps
)
.
Now suppose that there exists p˜ = (p˜n, p˜s) ∈ B↑2 such that fs(p˜) < p˜s. Then g(p˜) = fs(p˜), and therefore
J(p˜) < 0. As J(p) is a continuous function of ps and J(p˜n, p¯) = 0, there exists pˆs < p˜s such that J(p˜n, pˆs) = 0
and J(p˜n, ps) < 0 for all ps ∈ (pˆs, p˜s]. Thus g(p˜n, ps) 6 ps for all ps ∈ [pˆs, p˜s]. Therefore, by Lemmas 3
and 4 we must have D(p˜n, ps) > −q for all ps ∈ [pˆs, p˜s]. However, D(p) 6 −q for all p ∈ B↑1 which violates
τ(g(p˜))− τ(g(pˆ)) = τ(p˜)− τ(pˆ) given representation (9).
Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Theorem 1. The statement of the Theorem follows directly from Propositions 1, 3 and 4.
Proof of Corollary 1. From Theorem 1 and expression (2) we have
(1− q) · rH(p) > rL(p).
Therefore, if rH(p) = 0, then we must have rL(p) = 0 and p 6∈ R. If rH(p) > 0, then
rH(p) > (1− q) · rH(p) > rL(p)
which proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove the first part note that first, by Corollary 2 all continuation equilibria are
payoff-equivalent in B↑0 . Next, if µ <
1
2 , then Lemma 7 implies that D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B1, and therefore
all continuation equilibria are payoff-equivalent in B1 as well. As B
↓
1 ∩R = ∅ by Lemma 7 and ps can never
cross p¯ from below, seller’s value V θ(p) for p ∈ B↓2+ is equal in any equilibrium to the value of keeping naive
consumers in the market forever. Finally, in any equilibrium D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B↑2+: by Theorem 1 and
Lemma 3, D(p) 6 −q, and if there exists an equilibrium and p ∈ B↑2+ with D(p) < −q, then J(p) > 0 by
Lemma 3, which violates τ(f(p)) = τ(p) as D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B1. This implies that τ(p) is constant
across equilibria, which together with the above gives payoff-equivalence in B↑2+.
If µ = 12 , then D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B↑1 ∩ R with ps > p¯. Since on any path of play the game only
passes through one state in B↑1 with p
s = p¯ (which is the only state in B↑1 where D(p) < −q is possible), and
drift there is still negative, τ(p) in any equilibrium must be the same as in case µ < 12 (where B
↑
1 ∩ R = ∅)
for all p ∈ B↑1 . The same logic as above can then establish that D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B↑2+. Finally, in case
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µ = 12 it may be that B
↓
1 ∩ R 6= ∅, but both types of seller are in any such p indifferent between revealing
and deleting a bad review, and therefore receive the same payoff as if B↓1 ∩R = ∅.
The remainder of the proof is devoted to constructing an equilibrium that satisfies the requirements
of the second part of Theorem 2. We propose a strategy profile and show that it satisfies all equilibrium
conditions.
Construct the strategy profile as follows. Let B↑0 ∩ R = ∅, and for all p ∈ B↓1 build the strategy profile(
rH , rL
)
in such a way that B↓1 ∩R = B↓1 , – the latter is possible by Lemma 8.
For µ > 12 the inequality in (21) is strict for all p ∈ B↓1 , so by continuity of preferences of the high-type
seller there exists ε1 > 0 such that he strictly prefers to reveal at all p ∈ {B↑1 |ps ∈ [p¯, p¯ + ε1)}, i.e., these
states can belong to R in equilibrium. In all such states it must be that rH(p) = 1, and rL(p) is then defined
implicitly by (15). The latter can be reduced to the following differential equation for J(p):
(
1− (1− q)e−J(p)
)
·
[
1 + ps(1− ps) · dJ(p)
dps
]
= q ·
[
µ+ (1− µ) ·
(
1− p¯
p¯
· p
s
1− ps
) r
λqµ
· e rλqµJ(p)
]
(23)
with an initial condition J(pn, p¯) = −λqµr ln
(
2− 1µ
)
.37 Then rL(p) can be obtained from J(p) =
ln (1− q)−ln rL(p). By the existence theorem (see Pontryagin [1962], chapter 4, §21) a solution to (23) exists
in some neighborhood of (pn, p¯), i.e., there exists ε2 > 0 such that J(p), and consequently rL(p), is well-
defined for all p = (pn, ps) with ps ∈ [p¯, p¯+ε2). Take ε = min (ε1, ε2) and set rL(p) for all p ∈ {B↑1 |ps < p¯+ε}
as prescribed by the procedure above. At the remaining states p ∈ {B↑1 |ps > p¯+ ε} set rH(p) = rL(p) = 0.
The strategy profile in B2+ is constructed as follows. For any p ∈ B↓2+ let rH(p) = 1 and
rL(p) = (1 − q) ·
(
ps
1−ps · 1−p¯p¯
) 1
2
so that J(p) = 12 ·
(
ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)
− ln
(
ps
1−ps
))
> 0, meaning p¯ > fs(p) > ps.
In B↑2+ let r
H(p) = rL(p) = 0 for p ∈ {B↑2+|ps = p¯}. Let rH(p) = 1 for all p ∈ {B↑2+|ps > p¯}. We compute
rL(p) inductively over bands, where the induction statement is “rL(p) is constructed for all p ∈ B↑k and it is
such that D(p) 6 −q”. This is true by construction for k = 1, which starts the induction. Suppose it holds
for k − 1. For p ∈ B↑k we construct rL(p) so that (22) holds. In particular, consider a change of variable
z = ln
(
ps
1−ps
)
and let J(pn, z) represent, with abuse of notation, the respective transformation of J(p), i.e.,
J(pn, z) = ln (1− q)− ln rL
(
pn, e
z
1+ez
)
. Then taking the derivatives of both sides of (22) with respect to z,
we obtain the following differential equation for J(pn, z):
(
1− (1− q)e−J(pn,z)
)
·
[
1 +
dJ(pn, z)
dz
]
= −D (fn(p), z + J(pn, z)) (24)
with the initial condition J
(
pn, ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
))
= 0.38
We next show that a solution to (24) exists and is nonnegative for all z > ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)
. Suppose that
there exists p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑k such that J
(
pn, ln
(
ps
1−ps
))
= −ε < 0. As a solution to an ODE,
J(pn, z) is a continuous function of z. Therefore, there exists p˜s ∈ (p¯, ps) such that J
(
pn, ln
(
p˜s
1−p˜s
))
=
max{− 12ε, 12 ln (1− q)}. Then
dJ(pn, z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=ln( p˜
s
1−p˜s )
=
−D(fn(p), z + J(pn, z))
1− (1− q)e−J(pn,z)
∣∣∣∣
z=ln( p˜
s
1−p˜s )
− 1 > q
q
− 1 = 0.
37This initial condition is such that J(p) is continuous at (pn, p¯).
38The RHS of (24) is not smooth in J(pn, z), but is piecewise smooth. Therefore, as a solution to (24) we take a
composition of two solutions which are pasted together using continuity.
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Therefore, as we increase z from ln
(
p˜s
1−p˜s
)
, J(pn, z) could never fall below − ε2 , while we have assumed
J
(
pn, ln
(
ps
1−ps
))
= −ε – a contradiction. As ε > 0 was taken arbitrarily, it shows that J(pn, z) > 0 for all
z > ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)
. We next can take arbitrary solution to (24) in the neighborhood of its initial condition, the
existence of which is ensured by the existence theorem (see Pontryagin [1962], chapter 4, §21). It can be
extended for all z > ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)
if and only if J(pn, z) < +∞ for all such z (see Pontryagin [1962], chapter 4,
§24) which is true as ∣∣∣∣dJ(pn, z)dz
∣∣∣∣ < 1q − 1 = 1− qq < +∞.
Consequently, by Lemma 3 we obtain that D(p) 6 −q for all p ∈ B↑k , which concludes this part of the proof.
We next show that the constructed strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We first show that the
low-type seller is indifferent whether to reveal a bad review or to conceal it at all p ∈ B2+ ∩R. If p ∈ B↓2+,
then by construction 0 < rL(p) < 1. From Lemma 8 we also know that 0 < rL(p) < 1 for p ∈ B↓1 ∩R. Then
the value of a low-type seller in any p ∈ B↓1+ ∩R is equal to the value he receives in case he deletes all future
bad reviews: V L(p) = 1−µr . Therefore, a low-type seller is indeed indifferent between disclosing a bad review
and deleting it for any p ∈ B↓2+ ∩R. For p ∈ B↑1+ ∩R the indifference directly follows from the way rL(p) is
constructed and the fact that rL(p) < 1.39
By construction, the high-type seller strictly prefers to reveal bad reviews at all p ∈ B1 ∩R. We proceed
by showing that the high-type seller weakly prefers to reveal a bad review at all p ∈ B↓2+ ∩R. Concealing a
review at p ∈ B↓2 ∩R cannot yield him a payoff higher than if he could choose time T at which a bad review
will arrive and will be revealed:
V H(p) 6 max
T>0

Tˆ
0
e−(r+λq(1−µ))t · (1− µ) ·
(
1 +
λq
r
)
dt+ e−(r+λq(1−µ))T · V H (f (pT ))

= max
T>0
{(
1− e−(r+λq(1−µ))T
)
·
(
1
r
− µ
r + λq (1− µ)
)
+ e−(r+λq(1−µ))T · V H (f (pT ))
}
6 max
T>0
V H (f (pT )) = V
H (f (p))
where process pt is given by (4) with initial condition p0 = p. The last inequality holds because
V H(p) >
+∞ˆ
0
e−rt
[
e−λq(1−µ)t · (1− µ) +
(
1− e−λq(1−µ)t
)]
dt =
(
1
r
− µ
r + λq(1− µ)
)
for all p ∈ B↓1 since the high-type seller can delete all future bad reviews. The last equality holds because
V H(f(pT )) is independent of T . Indeed, distributions of arrival times of the next buying consumer are the
same for all p ∈ B↓1 . Therefore, V H(p) is the same for all p ∈ B↓1 . The resulting inequality V H(p) 6 V H(f(p))
implies that the high-type seller weakly prefers to reveal a bad review at all p ∈ B↓2 . The argument above
can be extended by induction to all further bands in order to obtain that V H(p) 6 V H(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↓2+.
We are left to show that the high type at least weakly prefers to reveal a bad review in B↑2+. We show
the argument for B↑2 , and the argument for B
↑
k with higher k then follows by induction. Fix some point
p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑2 ∩R. The high-type seller’s value in case he decides to conceal a bad review at p is bounded
39The latter is true as J(p) < +∞ for all p ∈ B↑1+ ∩R.
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from above by his payoff when he can receive and reveal a bad review at any time T of his choice:
V H(p) 6 max
 maxT6τ(p)
Tˆ
0
e−rt
(
1 +
λq
r
)
dt+ e−rT · V H(f(pT )),
τ(p)ˆ
0
e−rt
(
1 +
λq
r
)
dt+ e−rτ(p) · V H(pn, p¯)

where we use that psτ(p) = p¯. On the one hand, since deleting all bad reviews is always feasible for the
high-type seller, we have
V H(f(p)) >
τ(f(p))ˆ
0
e−rt
(
1 +
λq
r
)
dt+ e−rτ(f(p)) ·V H(fn(p), p¯) >
τ(p)ˆ
0
e−rt
(
1 +
λq
r
)
dt+ e−rτ(p) ·V H(pn, p¯)
where the second inequality follows because by construction τ(p) = τ(f(p)), and V H(fn(p), p¯) > V H(pn, p¯)
as shown above.40 On the other hand, for any T 6 τ(p) we can write
V H(f(p)) >
Tˆ
0
e−rt
(
1 +
λq
r
)
dt+ e−rT · V H(f(pT ))
because the high-type seller can reveal no reviews during [0, T ], and because if pT ∈ R, then the process given
by (4) with starting point f(p) reaches value f(pT ) at exactly time T (this is since τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all
p ∈ B↑2 ∩R), while if pT 6∈ R, then V H(f(pT )) = 0. Everything said above implies that V H(f(p)) > V H(p)
for all p ∈ B↑2+, which concludes the proof that strategy profile is an equilibrium.
Finally, to conclude the proof of Theorem 2 we need to show that the equilibrium has the desired
properties. We start with the fact that fs(p) > ps for all p ∈ R. By construction the strategy profile
already implies fs(p) > ps for all p ∈
(
B0 ∪B1 ∪B↓2+
)
∩ R. We next establish the claim for p ∈ B↑2 .
From (24) we know that J(p) > 0 for all p ∈ B↑2+. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists some
p˜ = (p˜n, p˜s) ∈ B↑2 such that fs(p˜) = p˜s, i.e., J(p˜) = 0. Assume first that f(p˜) ∈ R which by Lemma 3
implies D(f(p˜)) < −q. Then there exists ε > 0 such that D(fn(p˜), ps) 6 −q−ε for all ps ∈ [fs(p˜)− ε4 , fs(p˜)]
as, by construction, D(p) is continuous in ps.41 At the same time, we have that J(p) < J(p˜) + ε2 =
ε
2 for
all p = (p˜n, ps) with ps ∈ [p˜s − ε4 , p˜s]. By converse of Lemma 5 this implies that D(p) > −q − ε2 for those
p. Therefore τ(p˜) − τ(p˜n, p˜s − ε4 ) > τ(f(p˜)) − τ(fn(p˜), fs(p˜) − ε4 ). Consequently, J(p˜n, p˜s − ε4 ) < 0, – a
contradiction. Now assume f(p˜) 6∈ R, that is D(f(p˜)) = −q. Then (24) can be solved explicitly. Its general
solution satisfies
(1− q)(z + J(pn, z)) + q ln
(
1− eJ(pn,z)
)
= C (25)
where C is a constant pinned down by the boundary condition for z0 where z0 = inf{z|f(pn, z) 6∈ R} and
J(pn, z0) > 0 is given as a solution to (24) for z ∈
[
ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)
, z0
]
with initial condition J
(
ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
))
= 0.
Therefore, C is well-defined and finite. As we have assumed J(p˜) = 0 for some p˜, substituting it into (25)
we achieve C = −∞, – a contradiction.
All said above shows that J(p) > 0 for all p ∈ B↑2 . By Lemma 3 it implies D(p) < −q for all p ∈ B↑2 ,
and the argument then extends to further bands straightforwardly.
To see that this equilibrium is not payoff-equivalent to an equilibrium with R = ∅, note that, for instance,
40Values at the cutoff are equal to respective values under the cutoff since the latter are constant, and total payoff
is insensitive to alterations of flow payoff in a single point (i.e., the fact that strategic consumers are buying in ps = p¯
does not affect payoffs).
41Otherwise there exists a sequence of points {psk} such that psk → fs(p˜) and D(fn(p˜), psk)→ −q as k → +∞ which
contradicts the continuity of D(p) in B↑1 .
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the equilibrium constructed above has D(p) < −q for p ∈ {B↑1 |ps ∈ [p¯, p¯+ ε)}, as opposed to D(p) = −q in
the fully censored equilibrium, meaning that τ(p) is smaller in the former for all p ∈ B↑1 . Noticing that τ(p)
directly enters the low-type seller’s value in B↑1 concludes the argument.
Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Proposition 5. By Lemma 2 the low-type seller is indifferent between revealing a bad review
and deleting it at all p ∈ B1+ ∩R. Therefore, V L(p) = 1−µr for all p ∈ B↓1+ irrespective of equilibrium. For
p ∈ B↑1+ we have
V L(p) =
1− µ
r
+ (1− e−rτ(p)) · µ
r
=
1− µe−rτ(p)
r
.
Therefore, to show the claim we need to establish that larger R implies pointwise weakly smaller τ(p). The
claim holds for B↑0 (larger B
↑
0 ∩ R has no effect on τ(p) for p ∈ B↑0). Proceed by induction and show that
if the claim holds for B↑k−1, then it also holds for B
↑
k . For any p ∈ B↑k we show that if τ ′(p) = τ ′′(p),
then dτ
′(p)
dp 6
dτ ′′(p)
dp where objects indexed by single and double primes denote respective objects in the two
equilibria under consideration with R′ and R′′ ⊂ R′ respectively. Three cases are possible for every p with
τ ′(p) = τ ′′(p):
1. If p 6∈ R′, then D′(p) = D′′(p) = −q.
2. If p ∈ R′\R′′, then D′(p) 6 −q = D′′(p), where the first inequality follows from Theorem 1 and
Lemma 3.
3. If p ∈ R′′, then τ ′(f(p)) 6 τ ′′(f(p)) implies that J ′(p) > J ′′(p), which in turn means that
D′(p) 6 D′′(p) because both equilibria are semi-separating.
Therefore, D′(p) 6 D′′(p) for all p ∈ B↑k . Since τ(pn, p¯) = 0 for all pn, (9) implies that τ ′(p˜) 6 τ ′′(p˜) for all
p ∈ B↑k .
Proof of Proposition 6. As the seller of a high quality product never receives any bad review, after
any bad review beliefs jump to fs(p) = fn(p) = 0 and no future consumers ever buy the product again.
Revealing a bad review thus grants the worst continuation payoff, and is therefore strictly dominated by
deleting it for any seller who can guarantee non-zero continuation payoff which is true if either pn > p¯ or
ps > p¯.
Proof of Proposition 7. First let us introduce some extra notation for the general setting. Let
B−1 = {(pn, ps) ∈ B0|(fn−)−1(pn) > p¯} and B−k = {(pn, ps)|
(
(fn−)
−1(p), ps
) ∈ B−k+1} for k > 1.42 By
analogy with Bk for k > 0, B−k measure distance between pn and p¯: if p ∈ B−k for k > 0, then k less bad
reviews would be required to bring naive consumers back to the market.
Let us also refresh the expressions for belief updating for the general case. Rational consumers’ beliefs
are updated in the general setting as:
fs+(p)
1− fs+(p)
=
ps
1− ps ·
qH+ r
H
+ (p)
qL+r
L
+(p)
;
fs−(p)
1− fs−(p)
=
ps
1− ps ·
qH− r
H
− (p)
qL−rL−(p)
(26)
after good and bad reviews respectively, and as
p˙s = λps (1− ps) · [qH+ (1− rH+ (p))+ qH− (1− rH− (p))− qL+ (1− rL+(p))− qL− (1− rL−(p))] (27)
42Here function fn is meant in the sense of [0, 1] → [0, 1] (i.e., fn(pn)) since, as we remember, fn(p) does not
depend on ps.
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in the absence of reviews. Naive consumers’ reaction to good and bad reviews respectively is given by:
fs+(p)
1− fs+(p)
=
ps
1− ps ·
qH+
qL+
;
fs−(p)
1− fs−(p)
=
ps
1− ps ·
qH−
qL−
.
We construct the equilibrium as follows. For good reviews let R+ = B
↑
−1 and r
θ
+(p) = 1 for either θ and
all p ∈ R+. For bad reviews let R− = ∪k>1B↓k and rH− (p) = 1 for all p ∈ R−. Let rL−(p) for p ∈ B↓2+ be
constructed as in Theorem 2. Finally, rL−(p) for p ∈ B↓1 is constructed below.
We construct rL−(p) for p ∈ B↓1 in such a way as to make the low-type seller indifferent between revealing
a bad review and not. In such construction, V L(p) = 1−µr for any p ∈ B↓1 (and actually all p ∈ B↓1+ given
the remainder of the construction), so deleting all future bad reviews is optimal. On the other hand, for any
p ∈ B↑−1 we have
V L(p) =
ˆ τ(p)
0
e−rt
[
e−λµq
L
+t · µ+
(
1− e−λµqL+t
)
· 1
]
dt+ e−rτ(p)
(
1− e−λµqL+τ(p)
)
· 1
r
=
=
(
1− e−(r+λµqL+)τ(p)
)
·
(
1
r
− 1− µ
r + λµqL+
)
.
To clarify, this expression describes payoff from selling to strategic consumers until τ(p) and to all consumers
after a good review arrives if this happens before τ(p). The latter is valid because condition qH+ ·qH− > qL+ ·qL−
ensures that revealing one additional good review in any p ∈ B↑−1 brings naive consumers back to the market.
Given the strategies defined above, D(p) = −(qH+ − qL+) < 0 for all p ∈ B↑−1, hence
τ(p) =
1
λµ(qH+ − qL+)
(
ln
(
ps
1− ps
)
− ln
(
p¯
1− p¯
))
<∞ (28)
for all p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑−1. Furthermore, τ(p) is continuous and strictly increasing in ps, so V L(p) is
continuous and strictly increasing in ps as well. Finally, τ(p) → ∞ as ps → 1 and τ(p) → 0 as ps → p¯,
therefore V L(p) spans the whole interval
[
0, 1r − 1−µr+λµqL+
]
across p ∈ B↑0 .
Fix some p ∈ B↓1 . Let pˆ ∈ B↑−1 be such that V L(pˆ) = 1−µr . It exists for reasons described above:
1−µ
r <
1
r − 1−µr+λµqL+ whenever µ >
1
2 . Finally, let r
L
−(p) for p ∈ B↓1 be such that f−(p) = (fn−(pn), pˆs)
(closed-form expression for rL−(p) can be obtained from (26)).
The construction above trivially implies fs−(p) > p¯ > ps for all p ∈ B↓1 . It also generates f+(p) > ps
for all p ∈ R+. Construction in Theorem 2 also implies that fs−(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↓2+. This verifies the
first property in the Proposition. The second property is trivial – R− is nonempty for the strategy profile
constructed above. Therefore, to conclude the proof we need to verify two things: that the constructed
strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium and that this equilibrium is payoff-distinct from fully censored
equilibrium in any meaning of the latter.
We start by verifying that the strategy profile above constitutes an equilibrium. First, either type of the
seller at least weakly prefers to reveal good reviews at all p ∈ R+. This is because f+(p) ∈ B↑1 so D(f(p)) = 0
and τ(f(p)) = ∞.43 Simply speaking, revealing a good review moves seller to an absorbing state in which
he can retain both naive and strategic consumers in the market forever. This attains the maximal payoff, so
is always at least weakly optimal.
Low-type seller is by construction indifferent between deleting and revealing bad reviews at all p ∈ B↓1 .
43In case qH+ · qH− < qL+ · qL− which we do not consider in this proposition, one would need to either ensure that prior
p0 is such that fn+(f−(p)) > p¯ for all p ∈ B↓1 on equilibrium path, or to verify that the argument to follow holds even
if more than one good review is required to achieve B↑1 from any p ∈ B↑−1.
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This indifference extends to B↓2+. If in any p ∈ B↓2 the low-type seller chooses to delete a bad review, he can
achieve a payoff of 1−µr by deleting all future bad reviews as well. At the same time, revealing a bad review
at p (or any future state) grants him V L(f(p)) = 1−µr which is exactly the same payoff. The argument can
be iterated further to show that the low type is indifferent at all B↓2+.
The only equilibrium property left to verify is the high type’s preference. Suppose that the high-type
seller is currently in some state p ∈ B↓1 . If he deletes all future bad reviews, then his payoff equals 1−µr .
If, however, he has a bad review in hand and reveals it, then he arrives at some f(p) with fs(p) = pˆs and
receives
V H(f(p)) =
ˆ τ(f(p))
0
e−rt
[
e−λµq
H
+ t · µ+
(
1− e−λµqH+ t
)
· 1
]
dt+ e−rτ(f(p))
(
1− e−λµqH+ τ(f(p))
)
· 1
r
=
=
(
1− e−(r+λµqH+ )τ(f(p))
)
·
(
1
r
− 1− µ
r + λµqH+
)
.
Given that qH+ > qL+ and that the low type’s indifference dictates
(
1− e−(r+λµqL+)τ(f(p))
)
·
(
1
r − 1−µr+λµqL+
)
=
1−µ
r , trivially V
H(f(p)) > 1−µr . Doing the usual argument with the high-type seller solving a relaxed problem
in which he has a choice of when to reveal the bad review (used in proofs of Lemma 8 and Theorem 2), we
can arrive at the conclusion that he strictly prefers to reveal a bad review at p. Using the same argument as
in the proof of Theorem 2 we can then show that this strict preference propagates to B↓2+. This concludes
the proof that the constructed strategy profile is an equilibrium.
Finally, we want to show that the equilibrium above is payoff-distinct from fully censored equilibrium in
either sense of the latter (i.e., where R− = ∅ and R+ is either same as above, or also empty). In either case
it is enough to consider V H(p) at any p ∈ B↓1 . In either fully censored equilibrium we have V H(p) = 1−µr
because the high-type seller is unable to reveal any reviews. In contrast, in the equilibrium constructed
above V H(p) > 1−µr because this inequality is true for all p ∈ B↑0 and the high-type seller jumps to B↑0 from
B↓1 (by receiving and revealing a bad review) with a positive probability in finite time.
Proof of Proposition 8. We construct the equilibrium in a way analogous to Proposition 7 but accounting
for fake reviews. For good reviews let R+ = B
↑
−1 and r
θ
+(p) = φ
θ
+(p) = 1 for either θ and all p ∈ R+. For
bad reviews let R− = ∪k>1B↓k and rH− (p) = φH− (p) = 1 for all p ∈ R−. For any p ∈ B↓2+ let rL−(p) and φL−(p)
be an arbitrary solution of the equation ln
(
fs−(p)
1−fs−(p)
)
− ln
(
ps
1−ps
)
= 12 ·
(
ln
(
p¯
1−p¯
)
− ln
(
ps
1−ps
))
.44
Finally, rL−(p) and φL−(p) for p ∈ B↓1 are constructed in such a way as to make the low type indifferent
between revealing bad reviews and not. Similarly to Proposition 7 in such construction we have V L(p) = 1−µr
for any p ∈ B↑1 , while for any p ∈ B↑0 : V L(p) =
(
1− e−(r+λµqL+)τ(p)
)
·
(
1
r − 1−µr+λµqL+
)
.
Given the strategies defined above, D(p) = −(qH+ − qL+) < 0 for all p ∈ B↑−1 as in Proposition 7 (since
effects of fake positive reviews on D(p) imposed by high and low type cancel each other out). Further,
fs+(p)
1−fs+(p) =
ps
1−ps ·
λqH+ +λφ
λqL++λφ
for all p ∈ B↑−1, meaning that fs+(p) > ps so f+(p) ∈ B↑1 for all p ∈ B↑−1.
From here the fact that this strategy profile is an equilibrium and all required equilibrium properties can
be verified in exactly the same way as in Proposition 7.
44This is analogous to the construction in Theorem 2. It ensures that fs−(p) > ps and f−(p) ∈ B↓.
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